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K-SUE PARK

The History Wars and Property Law: Conquest and
Slavery as Foundational to the Field
abstract. This Article addresses the stakes of the ongoing ﬁght over competing versions of
U.S. history for our understanding of law, with a special focus on property law. Insofar as legal
scholarship has examined U.S. law within the historical context in which it arose, it has largely
overlooked the role that laws and legal institutions played in facilitating the production of the two
preeminent market commodities in the colonial and early Republic periods: expropriated lands
and enslaved people. Though conquest and enslavement were key to producing property for centuries, property-law scholars have constructed the ﬁeld of property law to be largely devoid of
these histories and without a strong conception of the formative role of race. As a result, recent
movements to reintegrate these topics into the ﬁeld generally reﬂect a broader trend in the legal
academy of treating race as an elective rather than fundamental topic. This Article shows that these
histories contain insights that are crucial for understanding their legacies in our present legal system. It offers an account of how current conceptions of the ﬁeld of property law evolved and what
we learn from suppressed histories. It shows that the histories of conquest and slavery explain
aspects of the system—its construction of jurisdictions, property value, ground-level institutions,
and organization of force, for example—that belong at the core of the curriculum and the ﬁeld.
First, this Article examines patterns of erasure in the property-law canon to explore how we
came to understand property law as primarily a collection of doctrines derived from English law
regulating relations between neighbors. It uses property-law casebooks as an index and offers the
ﬁrst comprehensive study of the tradition. This analysis shows that many of the norms of erasure
and validations of racial hierarchy that casebooks exhibit were set during the period of their emergence—the time of the formal close of the frontier and the Jim Crow Era. It was not until the 1970s
that casebooks began to critically examine the histories of conquest and slavery for the ﬁrst time,
but the query into their consequences for the property system has remained partial and inconsistent.
I then examine three ubiquitously taught topics in property law—discovery, labor, and possession— in light of the contexts in which they arose, to highlight their role in the creation of new
markets for land and people in early America. I show that Chief Justice Marshall’s iteration of the
Discovery Doctrine drew from an international legal tradition that authorized European conquests
and the transatlantic slave trade to establish racial hierarchy as the basis of U.S. jurisdiction and
trade in lands. In addition to affirming that hierarchy, as scholars have shown, the labor theory
also captured the ways that colonists attributed property values to land and people only when they
came into white possession. I further argue that the labor of property creation in the colonies in
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signiﬁcant part comprised legal work, beyond agriculture labor, including the passage of laws creating homesteading incentives, making enslavement racial, permanent, and hereditary, and establishing systems such as the rectangular survey, comprehensive title registry, and easy mortgage
foreclosure. Finally, taking possession of property in this context entailed a process of dispossession turning the principle of honoring possession on its head. Looking at possession as part of the
Discovery Rule and fugitive-slave laws reveals that the state largely delegated enforcement of possession—and the concomitant racial violence of dispossession—to private actors in ways that simultaneously invested them in property interests and racial hierarchy.
This Article opens a new inquiry into what these long-buried histories teach us about property
law. It argues that they are indispensable for understanding the unique fruits of the colonial experiment that deﬁne American property law today—the singular land system that underpins its
real estate market and its structural reliance on racial violence to produce value.

author. Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article beneﬁtted greatly from feedback and comments at various stages from Greg Ablavsky, Amna Akbar,
Lauren Benton, Bethany Berger, Maggie Blackhawk, Dan Ernst, Sheila Foster, Emma Coleman
Jordan, Priscilla Ocen, Claire Priest, Emily Prifogle, Justin Simard, and Joe Singer, as well as from
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the University of North Carolina. I am incredibly grateful to Thanh Nguyen, Tammy Tran, and
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the point. This Article is for her, and for all the students who, across the decades, told their property-law professors these histories should be part of the course. They were right.
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introduction
We are in the midst of an ongoing ﬁght over competing versions of U.S. history—an old struggle, older than the nation itself, that is currently in a period of
high resurgence. 1 After President Trump issued an Executive Order banning
Critical Race Theory in 2020,2 fourteen states took action seeking to limit, control, or eliminate the teaching of race and histories of racial violence in America
in schools.3 As of November 2021, at least ﬁfteen more states and school boards
across the country are currently considering similar measures.4 This controversy

1.

2.

3.

4.

See America’s History Wars, ECONOMIST (July 10, 2021), https://www.economist.com/united
-states/2021/07/10/americas-history-wars [https://perma.cc/ZE9U-XNWV]; Rebecca Onion, A Brief History of the History Wars, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2019), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2019/08/1619-project-conservative-backlash-history-wars.html [https://perma.cc
/44BK-TJ2E]; Olivia B. Waxman, Trump’s Threat to Pull Funding from Schools over How They
Teach Slavery Is Part of a Long History of Politicizing American History Class, TIME (Sept. 17,
2020), https://time.com/5889051/history-curriculum-politics [https://perma.cc/VPB43UV3]; Matthew Karp, History as End, HARPER’S MAG. (July 2021), https://harpers.org/archive/2021/07/history-as-end-politics-of-the-past-matthew-karp [https://perma.cc/R74C6LVS]; see also JEAN O’BRIEN, FIRSTING AND LASTING: WRITING INDIANS OUT OF EXISTENCE
IN NEW ENGLAND, at xiv (2010) (arguing that history was a primary means by which European Americans asserted their own modernity while denying it to Indian peoples).
Exec. Order No. 13950, 85 Fed. Reg. 60683 (Sept. 22, 2020) (“Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping”), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“Advancing
Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government”).
Seven states passed legislation. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1494 (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1902 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 33-138 (2021); IOWA CODE ANN. § 25A.1 (West 2021); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 70, § 24-157 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1-102 (2021); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.002
(h-2)–(h-5) (West 2021). Two state executive branches took similar action. 58 Mont. Att’y
Gen.’s Op. 1 (May 27, 2021); S.D. Exec. Order 2021-11. Four state school boards passed resolutions. Ala. Bd. of Educ. Res. (2021) (“Declaring the Preservation of Intellectual Freedom
and Non-Discrimination in Alabama’s Public Schools”) (noting plans to codify this resolution
in the Alabama Administrative Code); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6A-1.094124 (2021); Ga. Bd.
of Educ. Res. (2021) (“A Resolution of the State Board of Education of the State of Georgia
June 3, 2021”) (noting plans to codify this resolution in “State Education Rules”); Ohio Bd.
of Educ. Res. 13 (2021) (“To Promote Academic Excellence in K-12 Education For Each Ohio
Student Without Prejudice or Respect to Race, Ethnicity, or Creed”) (revoking an earlier resolution “To Condemn Racism and to Advance Equity for Black Students, Indigenous Students and Students of Color”).
Nine states have legislation pending. Some legislation is stalled in committee while some legislation is under active consideration. Compare H.B. 564, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2021) (as
stalled in committee after committee failed to kill the bill in a 7-7 vote), H.B. 952, 101st Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021) (as referred to committee, Apr. 28, 2021), S.B. 586, 1st Reg
Sess. (Mo. 2021) (as referred to committee, Mar. 11, 2021), A.B. A8253, 2021 Gen. Assemb.,
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has also reignited a row over the content of textbooks that tends to recur because
of their importance in determining what young people will learn and consider
fundamental about American history.5 At its core, this ﬁght revolves around the
question of whose story we will make the official story of the nation, and what
our collective reference point for imagining a future will be—whether we will
reinstall a story from the perspective of one dominant group, or build a story to
include the experiences and views of all.
This Article demonstrates that the ﬁght over competing versions of U.S. history is salient for our understanding of law and legal institutions in ways with

5.

Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) (as referred to committee, Aug. 25, 2021), H.B. 322, 134th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021) (as referred to committee, June 10, 2021), H.B. 1532, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2021) (as referred to committee, June 7, 2021), H. 6070, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2021) (as held for further study, Mar. 31, 2021), and H. 4325, 124th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2021) (as referred to committee, May 5, 2021), with S.B. 460,
101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2021) (as referred to Comm. of the Whole, Oct. 27, 2021), and
A.B. 411, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2021) (as passed by the assembly and referred to the
senate committee, Oct. 8, 2021). One state has legislation preﬁled for its next legislative session. B.R. 60, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2022) (as preﬁled by sponsors, June 1, 2021);
B.R. 69, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2022) (as preﬁled by sponsors, June 4, 2021).
Legislators from other states have talked about preﬁling for next session. See, e.g., Rebekah
Chung, Kansas Lawmaker to Introduce Critical Race Theory Bill to Ban it From Schools, KSNT
NEWS (June 25, 2021), https://www.ksnt.com/capitol-bureau/kansas-lawmaker-to-introduce-critical-race-theory-bill-to-ban-it-from-schools
[https://perma.cc/X4BYCKSG]. Some proposed measures are unlikely to be seriously considered. See, e.g., Hannah
Falcon, State Senator Brings up Critical Race Theory During Special Session on Medicaid Tax, ABC
17 NEWS (June 24, 2021), https://abc17news.com/politics/2021/06/24/state-senator-bringsup-critical-race-theory-during-special-session-on-medicaid-tax [https://perma.cc/AZY24LPK] (accusing Republicans of “political pandering” for introducing SB 5 during a special
session on another topic). Legislation failed in ﬁve states. H.P. 395, 130 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Me. 2021) (failing because of party-line vote); S.R. 56, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2021)
(dying in committee, April 1, 2021); H.B. 324, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2021) (resulting
in veto, Sept. 10, 2021); H.B. 544, 2021 Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2021) (laying on the table,
Apr. 8, 2021); S.B. 618, 85th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (W.V. 2021) (dying in committee, Mar. 10,
2021). But some legislators have talked about reintroducing legislation that failed this
year. See, e.g., Melinda Deslatte, Bill Targeting Critical Race Theory Divides La. Lawmakers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/louisiana/articles/2021-04-27/bill-targeting-critical-race-theory-divides-la-lawmakers [https://perma.cc
/P5M6-DCY6] (discussing a sponsor who stalled his own bill in committee but intends to
resume debate after revisions).
Rashawn Ray & Alexandra Gibbons, Why Are States Banning Critical Race Theory?, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ﬁxgov/2021/07/02/why-are-states
-banning-critical-race-theory [https://perma.cc/97U3-K8ZN]; Saﬁa Samee Ali, Amid Growing Critical Race Theory Legislation, Education Experts Say Textbook Content Could Be Next, NBC
NEWS (July 10, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/amid-growingcritical-race-theory-legislation-education-experts-say-textbook-n1272682 [https://perma.cc
/2YDW-9CDD].
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which legal scholars and jurists have yet to contend. The predominant understanding of U.S. law and legal institutions, most simply, is built on a narrative
from which the histories of colonization and enslavement—and the ways they
shaped the evolution of racial dynamics in this country—have been erased over
time. New scholarship confronting this past has gained in force and insight over
the last several decades, leaving the legal ﬁeld with little excuse for failing to integrate its ﬁndings into our conceptions of the law. The stakes are high, for the
way we conceive of the history of this nation, its legal institutions, and speciﬁc
doctrinal ﬁelds and principles impacts our understanding of these things in the
present. If our basic conception of how the U.S. legal system developed does not
recognize the fundamental role of race, then it is no wonder that we fail to understand the legacies of those histories and address racial inequity in the present.
The stakes of these history wars are therefore no less than the greatest stakes of
our legal system—namely, the ways that we organize our institutions to distribute power and resources.
Taking the ﬁeld of property law as an example, this Article illustrates the
work of reconceptualizing legal doctrines and institutions in light of suppressed
histories. The patterns and consequences of erasure and the work of reconstruction are speciﬁc to every ﬁeld, and it would be strange to assume rather than
substantiate the need for new theorization in property law.6 The ﬁrst Part therefore begins by examining how the histories of conquest and slavery have been
erased from property law, using the law school equivalent of a textbook—the
property-law casebook—as a metric for the disciplinary formation of the subject
in legal education. The three Parts that follow then demonstrate what we learn
from histories therein omitted through examples of topics from property law
that remain ubiquitous in casebooks and curricula today: discovery, labor, and
possession. Together, these four Parts offer an assessment of what we do not
know because of historical erasure, and how we came not to know it.
With this analysis, the Article aims to open a general inquiry into the impact
of historical erasure on our understanding of property law, and legal ﬁelds more
broadly.7 It further models a method for undertaking such an inquiry, in hopes
of inviting future work in dialogue. Perhaps most important, it suggests that a
consequence of erasing property law’s historical contexts has been a diminished
understanding of dynamics of the property system as a whole. The ﬁeld as currently conceived is fragmented into a bundle of loosely related doctrines. Indeed,

6.

7.

Elsewhere, I have called for a general presumption of erasure as a starting point for this work.
See K-Sue Park, This Land Is Not Our Land, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1977 (2020) (reviewing JEDEDIAH PURDY, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW COMMONWEALTH (2019)).
No single article could complete this work. See infra note 15.
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before I taught property law for the ﬁrst time, several people told me that designing the course is like assembling a train. You choose topics like cars that you
string together as you please. As a result, for generations of ﬁrst-year law students, the course has had the tendency to feel like a grab bag of topics. As I describe below, materials about conquest, slavery, and race have reentered the
canon relatively recently, but with the effect of making these topics optional addon cars in the property-law train, distinct from and less essential than, for example, units on servitudes, adverse possession, or nuisance. But the histories of
conquest and slavery constitute more than addenda to traditional doctrines and
present more than an opportunity to apologize or condemn a regrettable chapter
of the past. They comprise the train’s track, and are essential to explaining what
American property is and how it has been constructed by law.
Here, I seek to shift the ongoing inquiry into our property institutions and
law onto these tracks. Beyond merely including these histories, I hope to encourage us to ask about their profound impact on our institutions and their signiﬁcance for the interrelation between law, society, and economy in the United
States. After all, for nearly two and a half centuries, colonization and enslavement were primary modes of creating property in America. Beginning in the
early seventeenth century, English colonists up and down the Eastern Seaboard
grew their market in enslaved people to support their expanding occupation of
Native nations’ lands. By the eve of the Revolution, these imbricated processes8
had produced a situation in which property in land enclosures9 and human beings comprised approximately seventy-ﬁve percent of all wealth in the American
colonies.10 After its establishment, the United States continued to accumulate
property in lands and people as it extended its jurisdiction to its current borders
and the Paciﬁc. After the abolition of slavery, in a story beyond the scope of this

8.

Historians have long tended to address the histories of conquest or slavery separately, in a
trend too general to single out any person or work. For examples of scholars increasingly taking the imbrication of these histories as a point of departure, see DAVID CHANG, THE COLOR
OF THE LAND: RACE, NATION, AND THE POLITICS OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN OKLAHOMA, 18321929 (2010); WENDY WARREN, NEW ENGLAND BOUND: SLAVERY AND COLONIZATION IN EARLY
AMERICA (2016); PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL
AND POLITICAL EXPANSION (2017); and WALTER JOHNSON, THE BROKEN HEART OF AMERICA:
ST. LOUIS AND THE VIOLENT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2020).
9. This property-law term denotes an almost wholly naturalized understanding of how we organize and distribute land. It refers to privately owned parcels of land with clearly delineated
boundaries that distinguish the totality of one owner’s interests from another’s, and also, increasingly in the United States, identify the extent of an owner’s absolute and exclusive control over entry and use. See, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
10. ALICE HANSON JONES, WEALTH OF A NATION TO BE: AMERICAN COLONIES ON THE EVE OF THE
REVOLUTION 95-98 (1980).
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Article, the racism entrenched by slavery, in efforts to circumvent Black property
ownership and rights, would come to organize and reshape the land system.11
These processes transformed basic property institutions and practices in ways
that we have not explored, with consequences we have not understood.
Recovering the speciﬁc histories of how laws facilitated these processes also
opens up a world of questions about the role that racial violence has played in
producing the systems, practices, norms, and ideals that form the core of the
study of Anglo-American law. It further illuminates the signiﬁcant contribution
of racial legal logic to the creation and distribution of wealth. Private law, especially property law, facilitated the massive commerce in expropriated land and
enslaved people that underpinned the colonies’ and then the nation’s growth.
But while some steps have been taken to address the foundational nature of the
histories of conquest and slavery to public law,12 little to none of these histories
constitutes a part of the canon of most private-law ﬁelds.13 To the extent that
scholars have made pieces of these histories regular parts of curricula and conversation, as in property law, they tend to focus on the experiences of minority
groups and laws addressed to minority rights; in other words, including topics
on race usually entails lessons on Federal Indian law or civil rights, rather than
new perspectives on doctrinal areas considered to be the ﬁeld’s core.14

11.

K-Sue Park, Race and Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF RACE AND LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES (Devon Carbado, Khiara Bridges & Emily Houh eds.) (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 1, 8-10).
12. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
1087, 1087 (1993); Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1793-95 (2019); cf. AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
14-15 (2010) (arguing that concepts of political and economic freedom in early America were
inextricably tied to the subjugation of slaves, Native Americans, and women).
13. Some recent scholarship that highlights the role of these histories in private law includes Justin Simard, Citing Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV. 79, 81 (2020); CLAIRE PRIEST, CREDIT NATION:
PROPERTY LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS IN EARLY AMERICA 2 (2021); and Brittany Farr, Breach by
Violence: The Forgotten History of Sharecropper Litigation in the Post-Slavery South, 69 UCLA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4). A few examples of the broad literature, also not
part of regular private-law curricula, that explains how colonization impacts tribal nations’
engagement in what are typically thought of as private law transactions, such as contracts, or
leasing or mortgaging land, include Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Contract and (Tribal) Jurisdiction,
126 YALE L.J.F. 1, 1-3 (2016); Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1061-68
(1974); and Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Privatizing the Reservation?, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 791, 794-807 (2019).
14. An important exception is Daniel J. Sharfstein’s illuminating analysis of property as “personhood.” Daniel J. Sharfstein, Atrocity, Entitlement, and Personhood in Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
635, 640-43 (2012).
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Part I explores how we arrived at our present conceptions of the ﬁeld by undertaking the ﬁrst comprehensive study of property-law casebooks, from the late
nineteenth century to the present. Property-law casebooks are the jurist’s version
of the textbook: they constitute a venue for consolidating political, cultural, and
economic consensus about law. They record a continuous effort by preeminent
scholars to summate the foundational elements of a ﬁeld, and their selection of
featured cases creates a largely unchallenged narrative about what is signiﬁcant
about and in that area of law. Casebooks tell us the official story of the law and
comprise part of the background assumptions we bring to bear when thinking
about the history and canon of legal ﬁelds. They shape the critical capacities of
law students and have determined what generations of lawyers believe property
law to be. My analysis of the tradition in Part I shows distinctly different but
unmistakable patterns of erasure of the histories of conquest and slavery that
lasted until the 1970s, when scholars began to reintroduce material about both.
Now, casebooks ubiquitously, if marginally, address the history of conquest, but
they have never uniformly confronted the history of slavery.
The next Parts describe the genesis and development of the U.S. land system
and market through the processes of colonization and enslavement by revisiting
three theories about the initial acquisition of property—discovery, labor, and
possession.15 The unﬁltered history of each of these principles illuminates three
hallmarks of American property and property law: radical innovations to property systems and law in the colonies, the importance of these new systems to
property law and markets, and the central role of race in the creation of commercial value for American property markets. Part II explores the international law
of conquest that launched the histories of conquest and slavery in America and
how U.S. law drew upon this tradition in articulating a racial hierarchy as the
baseline for commerce in the Doctrine of Discovery. Part III pursues the consequences of understanding the labor theory as a theory about the labor of taking
possession of property in light of colonial and legal history. It examines how
15.

The scope of this Article’s analysis is limited to the three examples it selects from U.S. property
law. Deliberately, it does not take up legal doctrines or theories commonly understood to address the rights of minority groups in the United States, such as from the areas of civil rights
or Federal Indian law. Rather, if Federal Indian law is “primarily the law of conquest,” as Elizabeth A. Reese has recently clariﬁed, and “not the law of Indian people,” this Article shows
that core doctrines of property law generally understood as “neutral,” too, comprise part of
the law of conquest and the law of slavery. Elizabeth A. Reese, The Other American Law, 73
STAN. L. REV. 555, 563 (2021). I neither attempt nor purport to cure all the erasures of dominant U.S. legal narratives, but offer an inquiry here that is aligned with this collective effort.
In particular, it is adjacent to but distinct from the project of analyzing independent, equally
complex traditions of property law that originate in other sovereign histories, and telling the
difficult stories of how they have contended with pressures to adopt the ever-increasingly
dominant U.S. property-law model, within and beyond U.S. territorial borders, historically
and in the present.
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“property creation,” in this context, encompassed not only colonists’ creation of
markets based on European possession, but also the creation of major property
institutions and law in America: namely, laws that made enslavement racial, hereditary, and perpetual; chains of title rooted in Native title; the comprehensive
rectangular survey; centralized title registry; and easy mortgage foreclosure. Part
IV shows that prioritizing “possession” in the context of these histories entailed
facilitating and maintaining massive dispossession. Through the examples of
homestead incentives and the fugitive-slave controversy, it explores how the
state delegated the racial violence of creating and maintaining property in lands
and people—and the racial order that sustained the state—to private interests.
Part V reﬂects on how these histories enrich and transform our understanding
of property law and how it has shaped our world, in order to help us imagine
how it could.
i. historical erasure in property-law casebooks
This Part examines how histories of racial violence fell outside the framework of property law, even as they have continued to work across the landscape
in plain sight. As a result, scholars who recently reintroduced the histories of
conquest and slavery into the property-law course addressed a general void left
by a history of erasure. It is difficult to identify, measure, and assess erasure, and
a variety of materials could potentially provide clues about how the antecedents
of today’s history wars evolved in the legal academy—in other words, how legal
scholars came to understand ﬁelds through two versions of American history,
which either do or do not acknowledge race as a formative force in legal development. Among these materials, however, there is one important and widely
used index of a ﬁeld’s self-conception that, like textbooks, both captures dominant ideas about the past and contributes to the reproduction of those ideas in
the present: the casebook.
In the late nineteenth century, around the time that Harvard Law Professor
John Chipman Gray published the ﬁrst property-law casebook in 1888, the principal texts used for legal education shifted from treatises, which compiled principles of law distilled by scholars from statutes and judicial opinions, to casebooks, which collected original texts of judicial opinions and organized them by
key themes with accompanying commentary.16 Since then, elite legal scholars
have used the casebook to identify a ﬁeld’s most important frameworks, its rep-

16.

See Peggy Cooper Davis, Casebooks, Learning Theory, and the Need to Manage Uncertainty, in
LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 230, 230-31 (Edward Rubin ed., 2012).
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resentative doctrines and illustrative cases, and the background needed to understand its development. For over 130 years, the casebook has served as an engine of knowledge production, explicitly propagating what we know about
property from one generation to the next.17
This Part provides the ﬁrst comprehensive review of the property-law casebook tradition. While scholars have tracked the appearance of particular cases in
casebooks before,18 no scholarly work has undertaken a general analysis of property-law casebooks, nor of their engagement with the histories of conquest and
enslavement or the issue of race more generally. The analysis below is drawn
from the study of 173 property-law casebooks published between 1888 and 2019,
including subsequent editions, but excluding casebooks on real estate transactions and supplements.19 I searched for key case names and clusters of terms that
denoted the history of conquest, slavery, or post-abolition racial exclusion (e.g.,
“Discovery,” “conquest,” “colony,” “Indian,” “Native,” and “tribe” for conquest),20 searching electronically when possible and manually when not. I collected the relevant pages everywhere that cases or terms of interest appeared,
recorded the Section or Title where they appeared, and recorded the citation or
a characterization.
There is a difference between demonstrating the fact of erasure and explaining the phenomenon. The analysis below aims primarily to establish erasure of
the histories of conquest and slavery in the property-law curriculum and canon,
rather than to offer a complete theory of how and why erasure and collective
path-dependence occurred. As it describes the particular patterns of erasure that
casebooks exhibit, it does, however, offer some historical context to illuminate
the contours of their evolution.21 These patterns reﬂect the trajectory of chang-

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

While casebooks claimed these functions to some degree at all times, they did so increasingly
in the twentieth century as the use of the case method of teaching law became ascendant and
treatise-based apprenticeships dwindled. See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 60-63 (1983); John Henry Schlegel,
Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the
American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 317-18 (1985) (describing the gradual incorporation of casebooks into law school curricula).
E.g., Bethany R. Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE
L.J. 1089, 1095 (2006).
See infra Appendix A.
See infra Appendix B for a full list of search terms.
This initial study leaves many questions about casebooks open, including the correlation of
their content with that in the Restatements of the laws of property, and their relationship to
the American Law Institute, the Annual Programs of Property, and related sections at the
American Association of Law Schools annual meeting. Casebook editorial boards also appear

1072

the history wars and property law

ing waves of national historical consciousness over the last 130 years and the corresponding shifting imaginations of the ﬁeld. Casebooks emerged at a moment
of great ideological ferment, coincident with the formal close of the frontier and
the ascendance of Jim Crow. For nearly a century, though the law of conquest
remained “good law” on the books, casebooks suppressed this history in a departure from earlier legal-treatise traditions that centered it. At the same time,
for nearly half a century, they liberally incorporated cases involving the illegal,
obsolete form of property in people. Further, when casebooks ﬁnally dispensed
with slavery cases in the 1940s, they replaced them with another genre of cases
affirming racial segregation—those upholding racially restrictive covenants.
These patterns help us to understand why the property-law curriculum today centers English feudal doctrines regulating relationships between neighbors
rather than the radical experiments in property that colonists pursued through
conquest and enslavement. However, as I discuss in Parts II through IV, those
experiments led to innovative property systems so effective at wealth creation
that they underpinned the nation’s historical growth and remain cornerstones
of the American property market today. Moreover, we see that for most of their
history, casebooks have followed the current of ideologies furthering histories of
racial violence, rather than helping us understand how these histories shaped
U.S. property law. This Part takes stock of interventions by recent casebooks,
which began to confront the histories of conquest and slavery in the 1970s, in
order to contemplate possibilities for the future of this work. Despite scholarly
inroads, the history of conquest still appears only marginally, though consistently, in the standard materials for property-law courses,22 while most casebooks
still do not address the history of slavery. In the analysis below, the description
of erasure and recovery of histories tracks the way that the casebooks themselves
have treated conquest and slavery—as separate issues—and the scope of erasure
it examines is limited to the range of content that casebooks have contained. This
Article proceeds beyond those constraints in Parts II through IV, where it elaborates on what these erasures obscure, including colonial innovations, new property-law systems, and the imbricated ways that the racial violence of conquest
and slavery underpinned American economic growth.

to have remained long segregated and may have played a gatekeeping role; our initial examination of property-law casebook authors indicated no nonwhite editors until well into the
twenty-ﬁrst century.
22. In 2011, Professor Joseph William Singer warned, “We need to rewrite our history books so
that our children understand the actual process by which we acquired title to lands in the
United States.” Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest & Possession to Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J. 763, 773 (2011).
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A. The Erasure of Conquest
Nearly every property-law casebook in circulation today recognizes the fundamental status of the 1823 Chief Justice Marshall decision Johnson v. M’Intosh23
to the ﬁeld. In this case, which remains in effect, the Court confronted the question of whether purportedly conﬂicting private titles to land were valid if initially
purchased directly from the tribal nations that claimed the land, as opposed to
from the U.S. government. The holding clearly identiﬁes conquest as both the
proper root of private title to land and the sovereign jurisdiction of the United
States.
Because of the monumental import of this decision for conﬁrming the rules
for valid chains of title and therefore ownership of property in the United States,
it appeared frequently in nineteenth-century legal treatises. As Stuart Banner
writes, it “quickly assumed a prominent place in them, as the authoritative statement of the foundations of American property law” and “became part of the
canon of celebrated cases that all learned lawyers knew.”24 In his overview of U.S.
jurisprudence, James Kent drew on Johnson to explain how Congress came to
have “a large and magniﬁcent portion of territory under their absolute control
and disposal”: “The title of the European nations, and which passed to the
United States, to this immense territorial empire, was founded on discovery and
conquest.”25 Joseph Story opened his venerated 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, which he dedicated to Chief Justice Marshall, by summarizing Johnson’s explanation of conquest as the origin of sovereign title and
territory in the United States.26 Kent explained that the case was essential for
understanding “the history and grounds of the claims of the European governments, and of the United States, to the lands on this continent, and to dominion
over the Indian tribes.”27
Nonetheless, Johnson v. M’Intosh did not appear in John Chipman Gray’s
seminal casebook, nor in property-law casebooks thereafter until 1960. Instead,
Gray framed American property law primarily in terms of its descent from the

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER
188 (2005).
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258-59 (New York, O. Halsted, 2d ed. 1832).
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION §§ 2-6, at iii, 4-7 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
KENT, supra note 25, at 379.
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English feudal system,28 rebuffing a great American preoccupation with the history of conquest and the disposition of public lands. His introduction to the law
of real property focuses on aspects of the English system that perhaps distinguish
it most from its American offshoot: it devotes twenty-three pages, for example,
to topics such as the manor, military tenure, socage tenure, and tenancy in frankalmoign, which are at best marginally relevant to the American system.29 Gray’s
historical account of the property system’s evolution through public-land law in
England devotes a mere two paragraphs to “Tenure in the United States,” which
include the dubious claims that colonies were held as English manors, and that
American colonial property law was more feudal than England’s.30
This focus on English law sharply contrasts with other well-established contemporary understandings of property and American legal development. Story,
for example, began his Commentaries with Johnson’s summary of the history of
conquest and explained that “it would be impossible [to] fully . . . understand
the [Constitution’s] nature and objects” if we neglected “a careful review of the
origin . . . and juridical history of all the colonies.”31 In contrast to Gray’s suggestion that American property law was a mere English transplant, Story emphasized that “[t]races of [colonial] peculiarities are every where discernable in
the actual jurisprudence of each State.” 32 Where Gray’s introduction to real
property comprises a description of the English system, wherein “all the land in
the kingdom is supposed to be holden, mediately or immediately, of the king,
who is styled, the lord paramount,”33 Story recognized an American relationship
to property that was then unimaginable in England when he wrote that “there
has never been in this country a dependent peasantry. The yeomanry are absolute owners of the soil . . . .”34 Emory Washburn’s 1864 property-law treatise,
too, suggested that feudal tenure was never transferred to nor claimed by the
states, citing an American Jurist writer: “The doctrines of tenure do not here [in

28.
29.
30.

31.
32.

33.
34.

1 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY
385-408 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1888).
Id. at 385-408.
Id. at 407-08 (quoting Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N.Y. 68, 73 (1859) (concerning rent in arrears)). Hays is representative insofar as it was common in the nineteenth century to cite to
English authorities.
STORY, supra note 26, at 2.
Id. at 1 (“[O]ur domestic institutions and policy . . . have grown out of transactions of a much
earlier date, connected on one side with the common dependence of all the Colonies upon the
British Empire, and on the other with the particular charters of government and internal legislation, which belonged to each Colony . . . .”).
GRAY, supra note 28, at 385 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59, *60).
STORY, supra note 26, at 160.
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the Northwest Territory] exist even in theory.”35 Washburn further explained
that
[i]t is undoubtedly true . . . that many of the principles of our law of real
estate . . . were borrowed originally from the feudal system. . . . But it is
apprehended that the adoption of . . . forms of process borrowed from a
once existing system of laws, does not necessarily imply that that system
has not become obsolete.36
Neither prior authority nor the historical record, as I elaborate in Parts II-IV,
explain Gray’s exclusive insistence on English inheritance so well as ascendant
ideological tendencies of the time. In 1890, the U.S. Census Bureau declared the
frontier formally closed on the basis that there was no longer land within U.S.
territorial boundaries occupied by fewer than two white people per square mile.
Many American intellectuals were eager to move past the colonial experience to
place the United States on an equal footing with European nations. Gray’s casebook epitomizes an impulse to align U.S. legal and political systems with European traditions that his contemporary, Frederick Jackson Turner, famously critiqued in his landmark essay, The Signiﬁcance of the Frontier in American History.
Against the trend of emphasizing European derivation, Turner wrote that “the
peculiarity of American institutions is, the fact that they have been compelled to
adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in . . . winning a wilderness.”37 The American frontier, he argued, was
utterly distinct from European borders because it was characterized by movement, the promise of “free land,” and constituted “the meeting point between
savagery and civilization.”38 He bemoaned that those who wrote about the frontier mythologized the “border warfare and the chase” without seriously studying
how territorial expansion impacted the economy and history.39
Turner’s perception that the failure to attend to westward expansion was a
loss for scholarly, institutional understanding applies to the study of law as
well.40 For generations after Gray, casebooks mostly ignored the impact of over

35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

1 EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 43 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1864) (quoting Ohio Legislation, 11 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 94 (1834)).
Id. at 43-44.
Frederick Jackson Turner, The Signiﬁcance of the Frontier in American History: Address at
the Forty-First Annual Meeting of the State Historical Society 2 (1893) (published by the State
Historical Society of Wisconsin).
Id. at 3.
Id.
See infra Parts II-IV.

1076

the history wars and property law

260 years of endogenous legal development in the colonies and the early Republic, encompassing the creation of the survey system, title-registry system, easy
foreclosure of lands, and more.41 To the extent that they addressed the system’s
historical evolution, they focused on English feudal law, producing incongruous
and often mystifying texts as casebooks began, likely for practical reasons, to incorporate more American cases.42 It remained common to recite Gray’s suggestion that colonists had merely imported English property law to America,43 and
where the term “conquest” appeared, it referred to William of Normandy’s eleventh-century conquest, not English colonization in America. 44 Nonetheless,
cases in these books also referred, without explanation, to speciﬁcally American
phenomena, such as “lots” and “blocks” of tracts and the iconic 160-acre quarter
section of the survey, and even annuities granted for surrender of colonial interests in the Caribbean to the Crown.45 In the 1940s, Professor Ralph W. Aigler

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

See infra Section III.B. John Chipman Gray’s ﬁrst two books address the ancient English distinction between real and personal property, citing the thirteenth-century jurist Henry de
Bracton and cases almost exclusively from seventeenth- to nineteenth-century English
courts—King’s Bench, Exchequer, Common Bench, Queen’s Bench, Chancery—and one case
from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. GRAY, supra note 28.
With exceptions. See 3 RALPH W. AIGLER, CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY: TITLES TO REAL
PROPERTY: ACQUIRED ORIGINALLY AND BY TRANSFER INTER VIVOS (1916); RALPH W. AIGLER,
CASES ON THE LAW OF TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY: ACQUIRED ORIGINALLY AND BY TRANSFER
INTER VIVOS (2d ed. 1932); RALPH W. AIGLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TITLES
TO REAL PROPERTY: ACQUIRED ORIGINALLY AND BY TRANSFER INTER VIVOS (3d ed. 1942)
[hereinafter AIGLER 1942]; 1-2 RALPH W. AIGLER, ALLAN F. SMITH & SHELDON TEFFT, CASES
ON PROPERTY (1951); 1-2 RALPH W. AIGLER, ALLAN F. SMITH & SHELDON TEFFT, CASES ON
PROPERTY (1960).
See, e.g., ARTHUR T. MARTIN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CONVEYANCES 17
(1939) (“It is generally assumed that the colonists brought with them as much of the common
law and statute law of England as was suitable to their new circumstances in this country. . . . The extent to which these English forms and theories of conveyance have been a part
of our law is a matter on which there is some diversity of opinion.”).
WILLIAM F. WALSH, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 203-06 (1906); 1 WILLIAM
F. WALSH, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY REAL AND PERSONAL 243-46 (1922) [hereinafter WALSH 1922]; MARTIN, supra note 43, at 1-5; 1 WILLIAM F. WALSH & RUSSELL DENISON
NILES, CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 52-58 (1939); AIGLER 1942, supra note 42, at 226-27;
HARRY A. BIGELOW, CASES AND MATERIALS ON RIGHTS IN LAND WITH AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1-19 (3d ed. 1945); JOHN A. BLAKE, CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 1-6 (2d ed. 1948); HOWARD R. WILLIAMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 56-91 (1954); ALFRED G. REEVES, A TREATISE ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 339-85 (1904).
GRAY, supra note 28, at 2-6. For example, the ﬁrst case in the volume, Aubin v. Daly (1820) 106
Eng. Rep. 860, 4 B. & Ald. 59, concerns annuities granted for surrender of colonial interests
in “the Caribbee Islands[] and certain other islands,” including Barbados and the Leeward
Islands, to the Crown, 106 Eng. Rep. at 860, 4 B. & Ald. at 60.
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noted in passing that “[t]he practice of recording or registering instruments of
title, while general in the states of the United States, is followed only in portions
of England,” without discussing this difference and focusing instead on an English county-level recording statute.46
In short, Johnson v. M’Intosh and the history of conquest were largely shut
out of property-law casebooks for decades.47 Two exceptions during this period
indicate that property treatises did not follow casebooks in this respect. Homer
Bliss Dibell’s 1920 casebook drew on property-law treatises,48 including Washburn’s and another treatise by Alfred Gandy Reeves, which described U.S. title
as rooted in conquest, cited Story, and reviewed the history of the federal survey
and disposition of the public lands.49 Dibell, a Minnesota Supreme Court justice,
diligently described the history of Minnesota lands, some of which Great Britain
ceded in the Treaty of Paris and some of which the United States acquired
through the Louisiana Purchase.50 He acknowledged that “portions of the lands
ceded were occupied by Indian tribes after the Indian fashion,” brieﬂy described
the federal structure of Indian law, and summarized the issue of Indian occupancy, commenting that “[i]n theory at least the government respected their
rights of occupancy.”51 In 1960, University of Illinois College of Law Dean John
E. Cribbet followed Dibell and opened his casebook with a straightforward recitation of the root of U.S. title in government grants, “[t]he earliest of [which]
were made by European governments seeking to colonize the New World.”52 In
a footnote to this history, Cribbet and his coauthor made the ﬁrst substantive
reference to Johnson to appear in a casebook, in a description of recent Supreme
Court cases that relied on Johnson as good authority.53
46.

47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

AIGLER 1942, supra note 42, at 844-46. Aigler’s discussion of comprehensive title registration,
an indisputably American innovation, includes no history, only information for navigating
the system. He admits the Torrens System of Land Title Registration was used to colonize
Australia but argues that many European countries had earlier engaged in similar practices.
Id. at 979-83.
One casebook excerpted Barnett v. Barnett, 83 A. 160 (Md. 1912), which brieﬂy cited Johnson
v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), for the proposition that title is absolute. WM. L.
BURDICK, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 35-37 (1914).
HOMER BLISS DIBELL, CASES ON REAL PROPERTY 4 (1920) (citing 2 ALFRED G. REEVES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 1063-70 (1909)).
2 ALFRED G. REEVES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1405-14 (1909).
DIBELL, supra note 48, at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
JOHN E. CRIBBET, WILLIAM F. FRITZ & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 23-24 (1960).
See id. at 24 n.2 (citing Johnson for its holding that some traditional rules of property were
inapplicable to the “savage[]” Natives, and tracing the evolution of this doctrine in United
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In 1974, in the wake of massive social movements across the country, Professor Charles Donahue incorporated Johnson, along with the sit-in cases, into the
text of an American property-law casebook for the ﬁrst time.54 In 1978, Professor
Richard Chused followed and placed Johnson in a lengthy, groundbreaking section on conquest and Federal Indian law.55 By the time Professor Joseph Singer
published a casebook (which remains the standard for teaching about conquest
and race in property law) including Johnson in the early 1990s,56 the trend was
set. Johnson now appears in every property-law casebook, although teaching
notes differ widely in terms of providing information about the case’s content
and historical signiﬁcance.
Despite the inclusion of Johnson, as Singer observes, “[a]mazingly, some
property casebooks fail to mention Indians at all. Most property casebooks treat
conquest as unfortunate but past,” or arrange material “as if to show that we
have moved beyond barbarism to civilization.”57 In a different variation of erasure, Professors Thomas W. Merrill, Henry E. Smith, John Sprankling, Jerry L.
Anderson, and Daniel B. Bogart all omit a basic historical description of the role
the Discovery Doctrine played in European conquests, despite Chief Justice Marshall’s account in the case. Instead, Merrill and Smith describe its operative principle as the right of the ﬁrst-in-time,58 and Anderson and Bogart focus on the
principle of certainty.59 In other words, these scholars extract ahistorical lessons
from a case whose content comprises a history of conquest and which also constitutes a landmark in that history itself.

54.

55.
56.

57.
58.
59.

States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946), and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
348 U.S. 272 (1955)).
See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), as reprinted in CHARLES DONAHUE,
JR., THOMAS E. KAUPER & PETER W. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 235-40 (1974).
See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.), as reprinted in RICHARD H. CHUSED, A MODERN APPROACH
TO PROPERTY: CASES, NOTES, MATERIALS 80-95 (1978).
See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.), as reprinted in JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:
RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 25-35 (1993); SINGER, supra, at 1289-1308 (discussing the
relationship of property to slavery).
Singer, supra note 22, at 766-67 (footnote omitted).
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 97-101 (3d ed.
2017).
JERRY L. ANDERSON & DANIEL B. BOGART, PROPERTY LAW: PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PERSPECTIVES 17-27 (2d ed. 2019).
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B. The Erasure of Slavery
The arc of the erasure of the history of slavery follows a distinctly different
pattern from the erasure of conquest from casebooks. Early property-law casebooks, which appeared during the Jim Crow Era, included cases about slavery
ubiquitously and without reﬂection, critique, or acknowledgment that property
in people was, by that time, illegal and obsolete. That is, they included no information about the history of slavery, the laws of subjugation, nor the signiﬁcance,
scale, or impact of the trade. Rather, they presented cases involving property in
enslaved persons, and concomitantly the violent subjugation of Black people by
white people, as an unremarkable phenomenon. This practice dwindled in the
1930s, and slavery cases disappeared from casebooks by the late 1940s, only to
be replaced by a new genre of cases affirming racial hierarchy and segregation—
cases upholding racially restrictive covenants. While these cases were soon overturned, this change did not occasion clear reﬂection on the law of race and property. Casebooks did not address the history of slavery and abolition until the
1970s and have never done so widely or uniformly.
In other words, the use of cases illustrating white entitlement to subordinate
and control Black people was an aspect of the legal culture of Jim Crow. When
Gray’s casebook ﬁrst appeared, during the period when modern legal education
is widely understood to have begun, slavery had been obsolete and illegal for
more than twenty years. In the interim period, federal troops had withdrawn
from the South, allowing the white supremacist “Redemption” movement to destroy Reconstruction.60 The Supreme Court held that emancipation had no effect on debts or contracts for “slave consideration,”61 and decisions like United
States v. Cruikshank and the 1883 Civil Rights Cases struck decisive blows to efforts
to extend civil rights and equal protection under law to Black people.62 In the
1890s, through the turn of the century, the Court refused to intervene when

60.

See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 564601 (1988); see also W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD
A HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 659-98 (1935) (discussing organized violence against
Black people in the post-war South).
61. See Andrew Kull, The Enforceability After Emancipation of Debts Contracted for the Purchase of
Slaves, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 493, 493-94, 504-06 (1994) (synthesizing several cases on this
topic); John C. Williams, Slave Contracts and the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1009, 1011-25 (2016) (describing and analyzing slave-contract jurisprudence); see also, e.g.,
White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1871); Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654
(1871); Boyce v. Tabb, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 546 (1873).
62. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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southern states intensiﬁed their efforts to disenfranchise Black people. 63 The
federal government sanctioned de jure segregation, the diminution of educational opportunities for Black people, and their legal and extralegal execution at
the hands of whites.64 During the same period, Ida B. Wells launched her national antilynching campaign, and the number of practicing Black attorneys rose,
prompting new obstacles to bar admission. Though the ﬁrst Black lawyer, Macon Bolling Allen, was admitted to the Maine bar in 1844, Black attorneys “ﬁrst
appeared in signiﬁcant numbers” in the post-Civil War South.65 In 1890, almost
sixty percent of the 431 Black lawyers in the country resided in formerly Confederate states.66 These changes helped usher in modern legal culture as we know
it: Wisconsin instituted a written bar exam in 1865, followed by Virginia in
1896.67 Law schools, many of them white-only, proliferated, and the casebook
tradition was born.
By 1910, the number of lawyers in the country had grown to 114,704, but the
number of Black lawyers among them was only 798.68 In property-law classes at
the new law schools, students read cases that presented white ownership of Black
people as part of the natural social order. All but two casebooks published between 1888 and 1916 contained cases either directly involving property in people
or citing such cases.69 These cases often involved questions of devise and

63.
64.
65.

66.
67.

68.
69.

See RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 132, 139-41 (2004); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 652-53 (1895).
See VALELLY, supra note 63, at 139, 144-46; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898);
FONER, supra note 60, at 571-72, 582, 587-601.
Joseph Gordon Hylton, The African-American Lawyer, the First Generation: Virginia as a Case
Study, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 109 (1994). Joseph Gordon Hylton’s work combing through
Census records reveals that a “handful” of others joined Allen before the Civil War, including
in Louisiana while slavery was still in force. Id. at 108. In 1869, Howard Law School opened,
and George Lewis Ruffin became the ﬁrst Black man to graduate from Harvard Law, and
eventually, the ﬁrst Black judge in Massachusetts. Id. at 116, 140 n.138; see also J. CLAY SMITH,
JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944, at 103, 119 (1993) (describing Ruffin’s career); WILLIAM J. SIMMONS, MEN OF MARK: EMINENT, PROGRESSIVE AND
RISING 740-43 (Cleveland, Geo. M. Rewell & Co. 1887) (providing Ruffin’s biography).
Hylton, supra note 65, at 109.
Michael Marshall, Jim Crow Constitution Stiﬂed Virginia’s Black Lawyers, U. VA. SCH. L. (Oct.
13, 2003), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/2003_fall/hylton.htm [https://perma.cc
/J6DP-94V6].
Hylton, supra note 65, at 110-11.
See GRAY, supra note 28, at 50-52 (incorporating Brent v. Chapman, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 358
(1809)); id. at 53-56 (incorporating Bryan v. Weems, 29 Ala. 423 (1856)); id. at 56-64 (incorporating Chapin v. Freeland, 142 Mass. 383 (1886)); id. at 280 (incorporating Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug. 1 (Mich. 1843)); id. at 336-88 (incorporating Campbell v. Stakes, 2 Wend. 137
(N.Y. 1828)); id. at 638-40 (incorporating Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N.C. 63 (1871)); W. S. PATTEE,
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ILLUSTRATIVE CASES IN REALTY 606 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1896) (incorporating Allen v. Mansﬁeld, 18 S.W. 901 (Mo. 1892)); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, SELECTED
CASES ON REAL PROPERTY: SELECTED AND ARRANGED FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH THE AUTHOR’S TREATISE ON REAL PROPERTY 444 (St. Louis, The F. H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1897)
(incorporating Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296 (1891)); ELMER E. BARRETT, CASES ON THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY 40 (St. Paul, West Publ’g Co. 1898) (incorporating Ewing v. Shannahan,
20 S.W. 1065 (Mo. 1892)); WILLIAM A. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
LAND 221 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1898) [hereinafter FINCH 1898] (incorporating Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839)); FINCH 1898, supra, at 551 (incorporating Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S.C. 545 (1882)); JASPER C. GATES, CASES ON THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 63 (St. Paul, West Publ’g Co. 1898) (incorporating Sherman, 20 Wend. 636);
GRANT NEWELL, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY WITH LEADING AND ILLUSTRATIVE
CASES 344 (1902) (incorporating Morse v. Proper, 82 Ga. 13 (1889)); WILLIAM A. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND 221 (2d ed. 1904) [hereinafter FINCH 1904]
(incorporating Lushington v. Sewell (1827) 57 Eng. Rep. 641, 1 Sim. 435); FINCH 1904, supra, at 498 (incorporating Cole v. Lake Co., 54 N.H. 242 (1874));FINCH 1904, supra, at 551
(incorporating Burnett, 17 S.C. 545); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 33-37 (2d ed. 1906) (incorporating Bryan v. Weems, 29
Ala. 423 (1856)); GRAY, supra, at 37-39 (incorporating Fears, Admr. v. Sykes, 35 Miss. 633
(1856)); WILLIAM F. WALSH, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 334-36 (1906) (incorporating Jackson ex dem. Loucks v. Churchill, 7 Cow. 287 (N.Y. 1827)); WILLIAM A. FINCH,
SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND 218-24 (2d ed. 1912) [hereinafter FINCH
1912] (incorporating Sherman, 20 Wend. 636); FINCH 1912, supra, at 570 (incorporating
Twitty v. Camp, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 61 (1866)); FINCH 1912, supra, at 570 (incorporating De
Blane v. Lynch, 23 Tex. 25 (1859)); BURDICK, supra note 47, at 562-68 (incorporating Erck v.
Church, 87 Tenn. 575 (1889)); EDWARD H. WARREN, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 37-40 (1915) [hereinafter WARREN 1915] (incorporating Ford v.
State, 85 Md. 465 (1897)); WARREN 1915, supra, at 134-43 (incorporating Chapin v. Freeland,
142 Mass. 383 (1886)); WARREN 1915, supra, at 145-47 (incorporating Weems, 29 Ala.
423); WARREN 1915, supra, at 196-97 (incorporating Hepburn v. Sewell, 5 H. & J. 211 (Md.
1821)); WARREN 1915, supra, at 207 (incorporating McWillie v. Van Vacter, 35 Miss. 428
(1858)); WARREN 1915, supra, at 427-28 (incorporating Nelson v. Iverson, 17 Ala. 216
(1850)); WARREN 1915, supra, at 437 (incorporating Harvey v. Epes, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 153
(1855)); WARREN 1915, supra, at 443 (incorporating Adams v. Mizell, 11 Ga. 106
(1852)); WARREN 1915, supra, at 545-46 (incorporating Ayer v. Ritter, 7 S.E. 53 (S.C.
1888)); WARREN 1915, supra, at 728-34 (incorporating Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis.
7 (1899)); HENRY A. BIGELOW, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY: RIGHTS IN
LAND 635 (William R. Vance ed., 1919) (incorporating Salmon v. Matthews (1841) 151 Eng.
Rep. 1275, 8 Mees. & W. 827); WILLIAM A. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY
IN LAND 489-498 (2d ed. 1919) [hereinafter FINCH 1919] (incorporating Cole v. Lake Co., 54
N.H. 242 (1874)); EDWARD H. WARREN, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW
OF PROPERTY 37-40 (1919) [hereinafter WARREN 1919] (incorporating Ford, 85 Md. 465);
cf. JOHN R. ROOD, DECISIONS, STATUTES & C., CONCERNING THE LAW OF ESTATES IN LAND
(1909) (incorporating no slavery cases); RALPH W. AIGLER, TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY: ACQUIRED ORIGINALLY AND BY TRANSFER INTER VIVOS (1916) (incorporating no slavery cases).
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inheritance, and illustrated lessons concerning statutes of limitation,70 conversion,71 replevin,72 trover,73 detinue,74 trespass,75 adverse possession,76 gift and

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

Brent v. Chapman, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 358 (1809), as reprinted in GRAY, supra note 28, at 50-52;
Bryan v. Weems, 29 Ala. 423 (1856) (examining statute of limitations issues in the context of
the disputed inheritance of enslaved persons), as reprinted in numerous casebooks, including
GRAY, supra note 28, at 53-56; GRAY, supra note 69, at 33-37; WARREN 1915, supra note 69, at
145-48; WARREN 1919, supra note 69, at 145-48; HARRY A. BIGELOW & FRANCIS W. JACOB,
CASES ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 235-36 (William Reynolds Vance ed., 2d ed. 1931);
HARRY A. BIGELOW & WILLARD LELAND ECKHARDT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 260-67 (3d ed. 1942).
Harvey v. Epes, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 153 (1855) (discussing enslaved people hired to work on a
certain portion of a railroad who were taken to another portion, where they died), as reprinted
in WARREN 1915, supra note 69, at 437-38.
Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug. 1 (Mich. 1843) (citing Dunbar v. Williams, 10 Johns. 249 (N.Y.
1813) (involving a plaintiff who provided medicines to a person enslaved by the defendant
without the defendant’s knowledge)), as reprinted in GRAY, supra note 28, at 271-280; Woodson v. Pearce, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 416 (1858) (involving a slave owner who sought recovery of
property in several enslaved people, including a woman named Caroline), as reprinted in BIGELOW & JACOB, supra note 70, at 74-76; BIGELOW & ECKHARDT, supra note 70, at 128-129.
Hepburn v. Sewell, 5 H. & J. 211 (Md. 1821) (involving a slave owner who sought to recover
the value of property in enslaved children born to enslaved people named Sall, Patt, and Phillis), as reprinted in WARREN 1915, supra note 69, at 196-97.
Nelson v. Iverson, 17 Ala. 216 (1850) (discussing a slave owner who sought recovery of property in two enslaved people claimed by parol gift from his uncle), as reprinted in WARREN 1915,
supra note 69, at 427-28 (1915); WARREN 1919, supra note 69, at 427-29.
Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N.C. 63 (1871) (involving a slave owner who sought damages for loss of
turpentine and injury to enslaved persons), as reprinted in GRAY, supra note 28, at 638-40;
GRAY, supra note 69, at 611-13.
Chapin v. Freeland, 8 N.E. 128, 129-30 (Mass. 1886) (citing numerous lawsuits for the recovery of enslaved people), as reprinted in GRAY, supra note 28, at 56-64; WARREN 1915, supra note
69, at 134-43; WARREN 1919, supra note 69, at 139-40; WILLIAM F. WALSH, CASES ON THE LAW
OF PROPERTY 280-82 (1931).
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delivery,77 ejectment,78 standing,79 partition,80 community property,81 and charitable trusts.82 The broad variety of doctrines upon which these cases turned accords with Professor Justin Simard’s recent observation that “the law of slavery”
included not only the laws governing the status, escape, punishment, and emancipation of enslaved people—a category of laws now technically obsolete—but
the full variety of cases and doctrines comprising “ordinary” commercial law.83
These cases also give us a glimpse of how the lives of enslaved people were impacted by their enslavers’ health, indebtedness, and preferences between their
children, and of lawsuits brought by enslavers’ squabbling family members and
neighbors. In some cases, the disputes concerned the events through which enslaved people lost their lives, as with one unnamed woman in an action for conversion, who died after she was hired out for housework and then forced to work
in the ﬁelds.84

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.
84.

See McWillie v. Van Vacter, 35 Miss. 428, 449 (1858) (holding that title to a person set up
through a parol gift required delivery of possession), as reprinted in WARREN 1919, supra note
69, at 209.
See Allen v. Mansﬁeld, 18 S.W. 901, 902 (Mo. 1892) (involving a formerly enslaved person
who claimed a parol gift of the lot on which she resided), as reprinted in PATTEE, supra note
69, at 606; Ewing v. Shannahan, 20 S.W. 1065, 1068 (Mo. 1892) (citing a case in which the
guardian of minor children purchased people with the money of his wards), as reprinted in
TIEDEMAN, supra note 69, at 22; BARRETT, supra note 69, at 40.
See Bloss v. Holman, Owen, 52 (1587), as reprinted in GRAY, supra note 28, at 335-36 (containing
a footnote citing Justice Holmes for the proposition that an enslaved person has no standing
before the law).
See Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636, 654-55 (N.Y. 1839) (citing Lushington v. Sewell, 1 Sim.
435, 480 (1827) (holding that “the incidental stock of [people], cattle and implements” pass
upon conveyance of land)), as reprinted in FINCH 1898, supra note 69, at 221-22; GATES, supra
note 69, at 63; WILLIAM A. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND 221-22
(New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 2d ed. 1912) [hereinafter FINCH 1912].
See De Blane v. Lynch, 23 Tex. 25, 27 (1859) (holding that crops grown by enslaved people
belonging to a married woman on land she owned were community property), as reprinted in
FINCH 1898, supra note 69, at 968-69; FINCH 1904, supra note 69, at 968-69; FINCH 1912,
supra note 80, at 968-69.
See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 594 (1867) (discussing whether a trust created
to further abolition may continue its activities after abolition), as reprinted in BURDICK, supra
note 47, at 304.
Simard, supra note 13, at 86-88.
See Hooks v. Smith, 18 Ala. 338, 341 (1850) (“[Defendant] was clearly liable for [the slave’s]
value.”), as reprinted in WARREN 1919, supra note 69, at 147; see also Harvey v. Epes, 53 Va. (12
Gratt.) 153, 153 (1855) (holding the death of enslaved people to be a conversion), as reprinted
in WARREN 1915, supra note 69, at 437.
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A few casebooks from this period include cases that provided perspectives on
the legacy of slavery, the challenges Black people faced in acquiring and protecting their property rights, and even abolitionist sentiments. In 1898, for example,
Minnesota College of Law Dean William Sullivan Pattee used an 1892 case to
illustrate the rule that an adverse possessor can acquire title only to that quantity
of land she actually occupies. In that case, Allen v. Mansﬁeld, a woman named
Malinda claimed a lot upon which she resided with her children in “a small house
or shanty” enclosed by a fence by parol gift from her deceased enslaver; the court
noted that “[t]he evidence tends to show that she dug a well and planted some
trees in the inclosed part, and that she, for a time at least, had a small pig-pen on
the uninclosed part.”85 Her former enslaver’s family nonetheless sold the lot to
a third party, who paid taxes on the lot and eventually sued to eject her.86 Though
the lower court awarded Malinda title to the whole lot, on appeal, she was estopped from asserting title to the unenclosed part.87
In 1914, Professor William Burdick devoted an unusual forty-nine pages of
his casebook to the entirety of an 1867 case about whether a charitable trust created for abolitionist advocacy retained a valid charitable purpose after abolition.88 In Jackson v. Phillips, Justice Gray of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the history of the English slave trade and the history of
slavery in Massachusetts, as well as the history of the law of charitable trusts.
Toward the conclusion of that lengthy exposition, Gray stated plainly that
“[n]either the immediate purpose of the testator—the moral education of the
people; nor his ultimate object—to better the condition of the African race in this
country; has been fully accomplished by the abolition of slavery.”89 Even without
explicit commentary, Burdick’s inclusion of this case demonstrates that authors’
choices about the content of their property-law casebooks reﬂected a wide range
of contemporary views about slavery.
After 1915, and for over a decade thereafter, it remained common for most
casebooks to incorporate one or more cases involving or referring to disputes
about enslaved people to illustrate property rules.90 However, after signiﬁcant
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

18 S.W. 901, 902 (Mo. 1892).
Id.
Id. at 904.
BURDICK, supra note 47, at 269.
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 595 (1867).
See WARREN 1915, supra note 69, at 37-40 (incorporating Ford v. State, 37 A. 172 (Md.
1897)); id. at 134-43 (incorporating Chapin v. Freeland, 8 N.E. 128 (Mass. 1886)); id. at 14548 (incorporating Bryan v. Weems, 29 Ala. 423 (1856)); id. at 196-97 (incorporating Hepburn
v. Sewell, 5 H. & J. 211 (Md. 1821)); id. at 206-13 (incorporating McWillie v. Van Vacter, 35
Miss. 428 (1858)); id. at 427-28 (incorporating Nelson v. Iverson, 17 Ala. 216 (1850)); id. at
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activity protesting segregation and Jim Crow in the 1930s and 40s, the number
dropped. Furthermore, as casebook authors began to omit cases involving property in enslaved people, they also began to omit portions of decisions citing cases
involving property in enslaved people. 91 Though most casebooks dropped all
such cases, there were exceptions. University of Chicago Law School Dean Harry
A. Bigelow, for example, included several slavery cases in multiple editions of his
casebook through 1942.92 After that, casebooks adopted a new norm of totally
erasing the history of slavery from the study of property law.

437-38 (incorporating Harvey v. Epes, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 153 (1855)); id. at 443 (incorporating Adams v. Mizell, 11 Ga. 106 (1852)); id. at 545-47 (incorporating Ayer v. Ritter, 7 S.E. 53
(S.C. 1888)); id. at 728-34 (incorporating Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738 (Wis.
1899)); BIGELOW, supra note 69, at 635 (incorporating Salmon v. Matthews (1841) 8 Mees. &
W. 827 (Eng.)); WARREN 1919, supra note 69, at 245 (incorporating Reeder v. Anderson’s
Adm’rs, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 193 (1836)); id. at 338-40 (incorporating Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21
(1855)); id. at 434-35 (incorporating Hooks v. Smith, 18 Ala. 338 (1850)); JOSEPH D. SULLIVAN,
SELECTED CASES ON REAL PROPERTY 67-71 (1921) (incorporating Orndoff v. Turman, 29 Va.
(2 Leigh) 200 (1830)); id. at 187-90 (incorporating Burdis v. Burdis, 30 S.E. 462 (Va.
1898)); id. at 246-49 (incorporating Meeks v. Olpherts, 100 U.S. 564 (1879)); id. at 578-82
(incorporating Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U.S. 315 (1878)); id. at 951-54 (incorporating Parish v.
Murphree, 54 U.S. 92 (1851)); JOSEPH WARREN, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON
THE LAW OF CONVEYANCES AND RELATED SUBJECTS 728-36 (1922) (incorporating Newman v.
Chapman, 22 Va. (2 Rand.) 93 (1823)); Tiedeman, supra note 69, at 444 (incorporating Potter
v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296 (1891)); BIGELOW & JACOB, supra note 70, at 28-29 (incorporating O’Neal v. Baker, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 168 (1855)); id. at 74-75 (incorporating Woodson v.
Pearce, 33 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 416 (1858)); id. at 236-38 (incorporating Weems, 29 Ala. 423); id. at
306-08 (incorporating White v. Martin, 1 Port. 215 (Ala. 1834)); id. at 314-15 (incorporating McEwen v. Troost, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 186 (1853)); RAY ANDREWS BROWN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 396-401 (1941) (incorporating Miller v. Fleming,
18 D.C. (7 Mackey) 139 (1889)); id. at 547-50 (incorporating Koehler v. Rowland, 205 S.W.
217 (Mo. 1918); AIGLER 1942, supra note 42, at 380 n.1 (citing Hodge v. Blanton, 38 Tenn. 560
(1858)); BIGELOW & ECKHARDT, supra note 70, at 35-37 (incorporating Barwick v. Barwick, 33
N.C. (11 Ired.) 80 (1850)); id. at 128-30 (incorporating Woodson, 33 Tenn. (5 Sneed)
416); id. at 260-63 (incorporating Weems, 29 Ala. 423); id. at 264-68 (incorporating Gatlin v.
Vaut, 91 S.W. 38 (Indian Terr. Cir. 1905)); id. at 342-43 (incorporating White, 1 Port.
215); cf. FINCH 1919, supra note 69, at 489-98 (incorporating Cole v. Lake Co., 54 N.H. 242
(1874)); 1 WALSH 1922, supra note 44, at 243-46 (incorporating 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *48, *53-59).
91. See Park, supra note 6, at 1998.
92. See BIGELOW, supra note 69, at 635 (incorporating Salmon, 8 Mees. & W. 827 (Eng.)); BIGELOW & JACOB, supra note 70, at 28, 29, 74-76, 77, 231-33, 235-36, 306-09, 314 (incorporating
O’Neal, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 168; Woodson, 33 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 416; Barwick, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.)
80; Beadle v. Hunter & Garrett, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 331 (1848); Weems, 29 Ala. 423; White, 1
Port. 215; Troost, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 186); BIGELOW & ECKHARDT, supra note 70, at 35, 36, 128,
129, 260-67, 342, 343 (incorporating Barwick, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 80; Woodson, 33 Tenn. (5
Sneed) 416; Weems, 29 Ala. 423; White, 1 Port. 215).
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Around the same time that they phased out traces of slavery, however, many
casebook authors began to incorporate cases that upheld the validity of racially
restrictive covenants. 93 By this time, their incorporation indexed a delay in
deeming this law important to the canon. After all, racially restrictive covenants
appeared in the United States in the 1890s, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the validity of racial covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley in 1926.94 In Parmalee v.
Morris, a 1922 case that appeared in a 1933 casebook, the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld a racial covenant, reciting the Redeemers’ notion that civil rights
were “special treatment.”95 Casebooks also delayed incorporating cases about racial zoning, which the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional in 1917 in a
decision that did not appear in casebooks until 1948.96 That year, the Supreme
Court ﬁnally invalidated racial covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer.97 Though casebooks authors incorporated Shelley relatively quickly, they seemed to do so with
thinly veiled reluctance. Aigler, for example, tucked a citation to Shelley into an
unobtrusive footnote in 1951.98 And Byron R. Bentley, who had previously included many cases validating racial covenants, failed to offer a substantive update of the law, merely omitting the overturned cases and citing Shelley without
describing its holding in a hypothetical.99

93.

94.
95.

96.
97.
98.
99.

For example, Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 186 P. 596 (Cal. 1919), is included in BYRON
R. BENTLEY, BUSINESS LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 265 (1933); and 2 EVERETT FRASER, CASES AND
READINGS ON PROPERTY: INTRODUCTION TO REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 59-63 (2d ed.
1941). Koehler v. Rowland, 205 S.W. 217 (Mo. 1918), is included in 1 HARRY A. BIGELOW &
SHELDON TEFFT, CASES ON THE MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 494 (2d ed. 1940); and
BROWN, supra note 90, at 547-50. Meade v. Dennistone, 196 A. 330 (Md. 1938), is included in
MYRES SMITH MCDOUGAL & DAVID HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT 168-74 (1948). In Letteau v. Ellis, 10 P.2d 496, 497 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1932), as reprinted in WILLLIAM E. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 53236 (1943), a California District Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of changed conditions
to ﬁnd that a racial covenant could no longer serve its original purpose.
271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926); see Michael Jones-Correa, The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 541, 544 (2000).
“The issue involved in the instant case is a simple one, i.e., shall the law applicable to restrictions as to occupancy contained in deeds of real estate be enforced or shall one be absolved
from the provisions of the law simply because he is a negro?” Parmalee v. Morris, 188 N.W.
330 (Mich. 1922), as reprinted in BENTLEY, supra note 93, at 264-65.
Meade v. Dennistone, 196 A. 330 (Md. 1938), as reprinted in MCDOUGAL & HABER, supra note
93, at 168-74.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
RALPH W. AIGLER, HARRY BIGELOW & RICHARD POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF PROPERTY 725 n.57 (1951).
See BYRON R. BENTLEY, REAL ESTATE LAW WITH CASES, TEXT, AND FORMS 241 (3d ed. 1955).
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Though case law about racial zoning and racial covenants soon appeared
more regularly, casebooks did not explain the historical antagonism to Black
property rights that they illustrate. Indeed, both an executive committee and the
Supreme Court proved willing to make the connection between the racialized
landscape of property in the United States and the country’s history of slavery
before any property-law professors did. In 1968, President Johnson’s National
Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders released the Kerner Report, which began its account with the history of slavery and racist institutional development
after abolition, and characterized the racial unrest in 1967 as “the culmination of
300 years of racial prejudice.”100 In 1968, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Justices also held 7-2 that racial discrimination in housing constituted “badges and
incidents of slavery” that the Thirteenth Amendment had empowered Congress
to eliminate.101
The ﬁrst property-law casebook to articulate a connection between racial discrimination in housing and slavery did so obliquely. Donahue and his coauthors
included Jones alongside Johnson and the sit-in cases in 1974. In 1978, Chused
incorporated the ﬁrst independent section on the history of slavery and the abolition movement, consisting of selections from Dred Scott v. Sandford, a discussion of limitations on Black mobility and citizenship during slavery, and the
complicated legal issues involved in the transition to freedom.102 A few others
followed,103 and in 1993, the ﬁrst edition of Singer’s casebook was published,
including Dred Scott and a variety of historical and Critical Race Theory materials.104 But in contrast to the history of conquest, property-law casebooks’ initial
reckonings with the history of slavery never led to new norms in content across
casebooks. Many of the most widely used casebooks today do not mention slavery at all, or they mention it only in passing.105

100.

101.
102.
103.

104.
105.

Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Civ. Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REF. SERV. 19 (1968), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/8073NCJRS.pdf [http://perma.cc/75NB-BTNG] (“The Kerner Report”).
392 U.S. 409, 441-43 (1968).
See CHUSED, supra note 55, at 634-69.
See SANDRA H. JOHNSON, PETER W. SALSICH, JR., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, MICHAEL BRAUNSTEIN
& ALAN M. WEINBERGER, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 93 (1992); CURTIS J. BERGER & JOHN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 36-39, 1111-19 (4th
ed. 1997); J. GORDON HYLTON, DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL R. MANDELKER & PAULA A.
FRANZESE, PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND MATERIALS 28-31 (1998).
SINGER, supra note 56, at 1289-1308.
ANDERSON & BOGART, supra note 59; JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (4th ed. 2018); see also Park, supra note 6, at 1998 (providing a descriptive overview).
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Both property-law scholarship and casebooks amply illustrate conspicuous
avoidance of the history and legacy of American chattel slavery alongside awkward, marginal mentions of the word. Analyzing the twenty-ﬁve most cited articles on the law of real property published between 1990 and 2015 reveals that
only two address the history of slavery (or conquest) substantially.106 Eight articles mention the word “slavery” in footnotes, in passing, or reference the abstract condition of enslavement rather than the history of American chattel slavery.107 Similarly, the current edition of Dukeminier’s leading casebook mentions
the word “slavery” just twice—ﬁrst, in a footnote in reference to an English judge
who opposed slavery in England. Second, when discussing John Locke’s identiﬁcation of an inherent right to property in one’s person, the authors write that
“[s]lavery, obviously, was in opposition to that proposition, but slavery has been
abolished. So, can we now say, without qualiﬁcation, that you have property in
yourself?”108
Another example illustrates how unexpected the contours of the invisibility
of history can be. Like all property-law casebooks and Bar examiners, Dukeminier’s casebook uses the terms “Whiteacre” and “Blackacre” as legal kadigans for
106.

One additional article mentions conquest in a footnote. See Park, supra note 11 (manuscript at
2) (discussing a list compiled by Professor Ted Sichelman for the New Private Law group at
Harvard Law School).
107. Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1321 (1993) (using “slavery” and “Stalin’s dispossession of Ukrainian kulaks” as counterexamples to a theory of land distribution);
id. at 1349 n.161 (contrasting slavery with the article’s analysis of land distribution); John F.
Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Signiﬁcance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1252, 1275 (1996) (citing a town ordinance that prohibited renting “any Tenement to a Slave”);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111
YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (using the phrase “slavish devotion”); Merrill & Smith, supra, at 362
n.20 (noting Adam Smith’s theory of slavery and economic incentives); Merrill & Smith, supra, at 378 nn.83-84 (citing to a contract-law theory of slavery); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 805 n.229 (1996) (comparing chattel slavery
with “contractual” slavery); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and
Folktales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 141 (1998) (“Until the later
nineteenth century, our ideas of the correct ordering of the family relegated married women
(along with slaves) to propertilessness.”); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 passim (1996) (mentioning slavery several times in passing or in
footnotes to reinforce or illustrate arguments); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077,
1162-63 (1993) (offering “slavery” as an example of “a using so vicious that the Constitution
bars it even in private relations”); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1447-48 (1993)
(pointing to a Kentucky constitutional provision enshrining slavery as an example of property
law adapting to social change); Sax, supra, at 1448 n.70, 1451 n.85 (noting the continuing respect for slave owners’ property rights after emancipation).
108. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H. SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 167 (9th ed. 2018).
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a hypothetical estate. Uniquely, however, it also speculates about how these
terms became traditional. After noting, “just why no one knows for sure,” it offers the Oxford English Dictionary’s suggestion that it was traditional to denote
lands growing different crops by color (“peas and beans are black, corn and potatoes are white”), and the possibility of lands receiving rents (“black rents are
payable in produce, white rents in silver”). 109 My own search found that the
terms, infrequent but present in English legal treatises,110 also constituted the
title of a proslavery novel that appeared in 1856, the same year the Court decided
Dred Scott, from a prominent Confederate press. William Burwell, the author of
White Acre vs. Black Acre,111 was the son of a Virginia politician by the same name
who served as private secretary to Thomas Jefferson, and was a representative in
the Virginia House of Delegates and in the U.S. House of Representatives; Burwell enslaved nearly 100 people.112 The younger Burwell was also a slaveowner
who served in the Virginia House of Delegates, and his daughter Letitia followed
him in writing books that vigorously defended slavery and “the Lost Cause.”113
In Burwell’s allegorical novel, which formed part of the literary response to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s antislavery classic Uncle Tom’s Cabin,114 “White Acre” was
an incompetent northern farm and “Black Acre,” a southern plantation labored
upon by loyal, hardworking slaves. It seems likely that the deployment of these
terms by a member of a high-proﬁle political family to defend slavery so publicly
at this turbulent time might have had some inﬂuence on their popular connotations and meaning, or at least as much as obscure English planting terminology.
The two frequently cited scholars who did substantially discuss slavery and
conquest in relation to property law both observed that these histories, properly

109.
110.

111.
112.
113.

114.

Id. at 101.
See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLANDE, OR,
A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 52 (London, 2d ed. 1628); FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 89 (London, 5th ed. 1788). For an example of historical use of the Blackacre and Whiteacre terminology, see 1 SIR THOMAS EDLYNE
TOMLINS, THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE OF
THE BRITISH LAW 441 (London, 3d ed. 1820).
WILLIAM MACCREARY BURWELL, WHITE ACRE VS. BLACK ACRE (Richmond, J.W. Randolph
1856).
1830 U.S. Federal Census for Franklin County, Virginia, at 19-20 (indicating that William A.
Burwell claimed ownership of 96 enslaved people).
See LETITIA BURWELL, A GIRL’S LIFE IN VIRGINIA BEFORE THE WAR (New York, Frederick A.
Stokes Co. 1895); see also STEPHANIE JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE
WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 201-02 (2019) (discussing Letitia Burwell’s belief that “[s]lavery beneﬁted the enslaved”).
HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN: OR, LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY (Ann Douglas
ed., Penguin Books 1981) (1852).
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taken up, would require rethinking many fundamental presuppositions of the
ﬁeld. Singer, for example, analyzed Native nations’ property rights through Federal Indian law decisions, including Johnson, to bluntly assert that “both property
rights and political power in the United States are associated with a system of
racial caste.”115 Similarly, Professor Cheryl I. Harris wrote that “[t]he legal legacy of slavery and of the seizure of land from Native American peoples is not
merely a regime of property law that is (mis)informed by racist and ethnocentric
themes.”116 Rather, out of “the parallel systems of domination of Black and Native American people . . . were created racially contingent forms of property and
property rights.”117 Parts II-IV turn to speciﬁc property-law topics to show how
these broad insights translate into new perspectives on speciﬁc structures, practices, and institutions of property law.
ii. discovery and the racial hierarchy of commercial
empire
Today, the Discovery Doctrine is taught as the law of ﬁnders—the rule that
the ﬁrst to ﬁnd a thing may keep it.118 Though Johnson v. M’Intosh appears in
nearly every casebook today, it is not always used to teach Discovery, perhaps
because it is not possible to draw this abstract rule from the case without acknowledging or treating as unremarkable the racial hierarchy on which it is
based. In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall explicitly adopted the Discovery Doctrine from his understanding of the ﬁrst-in-time rule that ordered relations between European nations vying for domination outside of Europe during the socalled “Age of Discovery.” “On the discovery of this immense continent,” he
wrote, “the great nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so
much of it as they could respectively acquire.”119 From this de facto account of
Europeans’ agreement to observe the principle of ﬁrst-in-time between themselves as they sought to expand their empires, Marshall extracted a rule of racial
hierarchy to apply to the facts in Johnson. He thereby resolved a dispute over land
between parties who traced their titles from competing sources—the Native title
held by tribal nations and the title by conquest held by the United States—by

115.

Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991).
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1724 (1993).
117. Id. at 1714.
118. In property-law classes today, a case involving rights to a baseball thrown to the crowd is most
often used to teach an abstract version of this rule. See Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002
WL 31833731, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).
119. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823).
116.
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elevating U.S. title over Native title, and clearly establishing conquest as the basis
of U.S. sovereignty and property.
This Part explores the international legal history of conquest that Chief Justice Marshall invoked as precedent in order to examine Marshall’s innovative articulation of the Discovery Rule for U.S. law.120 The theoretical and historical
continuity of Marshall’s rule with older traditions places Johnson squarely within
a legal tradition that guided a broader European racial project of wealth creation
through conquest and enslavement. Yet Marshall’s history of European discovery obscured the issue of slavery and isolated the question of territorial sovereignty. Further, with respect to sovereignty, Marshall went beyond older traditions to formally recognize racial hierarchy as an explicit legal principle of U.S.
sovereignty and jurisdiction. This hierarchy allowed Marshall to map out the
parameters of the United States’s legal authority, and speciﬁcally, its power to
regulate a land market and make land a source of unprecedented commercial
value. That legal authority historically constituted the source of powers to regulate settlers’ occupation or actual possession of lands in America, whose historical
importance Marshall emphasizes in his rule and which the next Parts further
discuss. More immediately, Johnson delineated the legal relations between Native
nations, private citizens, and the United States to clarify the baseline according
to which expropriation or transactional activity for lands could proceed.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that simply reading the decision places the Discovery Doctrine in view of suppressed histories of racial violence, since Chief Justice Marshall explicitly recounts European conquests in
America. However, studying the doctrine within the broader legal context of
“discovery” illuminates the ways that Marshall’s account is reductive, tendentious, and inventive.121 Among other distortions, the decision artiﬁcially separates the history of slavery from that of conquest: the transatlantic slave trade,
120.

Several casebooks already offer useful historical context for the decision (e.g., the factual background that produced the dispute) or the immediate legal context of the decision (e.g., the
Trade and Intercourse Acts). See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, BETHANY R. BERGER, NESTOR
M. DAVIDSON & EDUARDO PENALVER, PROPERTY LAW, RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 96-101
(1993). However, neither the broader legal context I present here nor the discussion of the
case’s ramiﬁcations for the production of commercial value through racial hierarchy and conquest appear in any casebooks.
121. I am noting that Chief Justice Marshall made contributions to the Discovery Doctrine—obscuring its relation to enslavement and making its racial hierarchy an explicit principle of the
land market—that are distinct from the liberties he took in making the decision turn on the
Discovery Rule in the ﬁrst place, which other scholars have discussed. See, e.g., LINDSAY ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 45-75 (2005) (arguing that the Court in Johnson endorsed a view of
the Discovery Doctrine that resulted in devastating effects on Indigenous peoples and their
lands); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV.
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too, emerged from the history of legal reasoning he describes. During the period
of the Crusades, building on the Catholic Church’s notion that it had worldwide
papal jurisdiction and the duty to build a universal Christian Commonwealth,
canon lawyers developed the idea that holy war waged by Christians against inﬁdels was “just war.”122 In 1436, ongoing Portuguese and Spanish raids of islands off the Iberian coast prompted Pope Eugenius IV to issue the Romanus
Pontifex, a papal bull that referred to the savage ways of inﬁdel natives to affirm
Portuguese claims that their conquests were on behalf of Christianity. Pope
Nicholas V repeated these arguments in the Dum Diversas of 1452 and another
Romanus Pontifex in 1454, to authorize Portugal’s ongoing entry into West Africa
to seize and enslave people.123 These activities launched the transatlantic trade,
which the English joined after establishing colonies in mainland America and
the Caribbean in the seventeenth century. In Johnson, however, Marshall’s discussion of discovery is conﬁned to the subject of sovereignty and property in
land, while in The Antelope, two years later, he obliquely referenced this longer
history of enslavement during conquest by identifying the theory of just war as
the positive-law origin of the transatlantic slave trade.124 Although it is worth
noting that most African enslavement did not result from captives taken in war,
the extensive enslavement of Native people during the colonial period—another
part of the history of conquest omitted from Marshall’s account of conquest
here—generally did.125

122.

123.
124.
125.

627, 633-39 (2006) (detailing scholars’ disagreement with Chief Justice Marshall’s application
of the Discovery Doctrine in Johnson).
ALLAN GREER, PROPERTY AND DISPOSSESSION: NATIVES, EMPIRES AND LANDS IN EARLY MODERN NORTH AMERICA 196 (2018). In the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV focused on
Christians’ legal authority to dispossess non-Christians’ dominium. See ROBERT J. MILLER,
JACINTA RURU, LARISSA BEHRENDT & TRACEY LINDBERG, DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS:
THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 9 (2010); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR.,
THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 13-18,
24, 28-32 (1990); ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN
SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE C.1500-C.1800, at 8, 24, 126 (1995); Brian Slattery, Paper Empires:
The Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America, in DESPOTIC DOMINION:
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES 50, 54-56 (John McLaren, A.R. Buck &
Nancy E. Wright eds., 2003).
See WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 71; MILLER ET AL., supra note 122, at 11; HUGH THOMAS, THE
SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: 1440-1870, at 64-65 (1997).
See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 116-23 (1825).
See ALAN GALLAY, THE INDIAN SLAVE TRADE: THE RISE OF THE ENGLISH EMPIRE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1670-1717, at 63-67 (2002); MARGARET ELLEN NEWELL, BRETHREN BY NATURE:
NEW ENGLAND INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 1-16 (2015).
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Chief Justice Marshall’s account thereby limited the discussion in Johnson not
only to the United States’s relationship with tribal nations, but even more speciﬁcally, to the question of territorial sovereignty. It further simpliﬁed the history
that provides legal authority for the decision by broadly using the term “discovery” to denote what historically comprised a broad set of evolving European rationales for conquest during the so-called “Age of Discovery” in the early modern period.126 The principle of noninterference that produces the ﬁrst-in-time
rule between European sovereigns can be traced back to principles contained in
the papal bulls.127 The blanket use of the term “discovery” for this centuries-long
tradition, however, obscures an important shift in the underlying legal authority
for conquest from the era of these bulls, when the source of legal edicts was the
Church, to broader customary international law. In the sixteenth century, Francisco de Vitoria and the Spanish Scholastics introduced a conception of a universal, European-identiﬁed ius gentium, or law of nations, that facilitated this shift.
Historically, this new order of customary international law, which drew in what
Professors Lauren Benton and Benjamin Straumann have called a “scattershot”
and inclusive manner from a bundle of Roman law principles,128 produced opportunities for England and France, which had no papal grants, to make claims
of conquest at all. 129 Further, the theoretical contours of this order, to which
Marshall’s decision explicitly refers, illuminates how much he drew from and
altered it. Like the Spanish Scholastics, Marshall conceived of empire as a commercial realm based on a universal and sacrosanct right of property. However,
he doctrinally captured a practice of claims-making developed by the English,

126.

In a recent article, Professor Douglas Lind describes four discrete Discovery Doctrines: 1) the
medieval papal theories captured in the papal bulls above described; 2) the “natural law right
of discovery” under the law of nations elaborated by Vitoria and the Scholastics that I describe
in the next paragraph; 3) Marshall’s articulation of the doctrine for United States law (the
focus of this section); and 4) the British theory of terra nullius that underpinned the conquest
of Australia. See Douglas Lind, Doctrines of Discovery, 13 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 1, 8-9 (2020).
127. Perhaps most famously, Pope Alexander VI’s 1493 Inter Caetera II drew a boundary between
Spain and Portugal’s zones of “discovery,” delineating their respective “spheres of inﬂuence”
with which the other was not to interfere; bilateral treaties between the two countries, such
as the Treaty of Tordesillas, subsequently modiﬁed this boundary line. See PAGDEN, supra note
122, at 31-33, 47; Slattery, supra note 122, at 55; Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice, 28 LAW & HIST.
REV. 1, 9, 19 (2010).
128. Benton & Straumann, supra note 127, at 29.
129. See Slattery, supra note 122, at 56-71 (describing the legal arguments France and England developed to challenge Spain and Portugal’s monopoly claims on conquest and the authority of
the papal bulls); see also PAGDEN, supra note 122, at 76-80 (explaining that the British and
French turned instead to theories of title by possession and labor—occupying and cultivating
res nullius).
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French, Swedish, and Dutch by incorporating the requirement of possession into
the rule, and he explicitly articulated the racial hierarchy of conquest—which
theories of the law of nations had left implicit—as the basis of trade, or transactions for land.130
Unlike earlier canon lawyers’ theories of conquest that excluded Native people from the realm of humanity and law,131 the Spanish Scholastics’ model was
formally inclusive: Vitoria, for example, argued that Indians had reason and natural-law rights of dominium.132 These rights were imagined to be “universal” in
a commercial world where Vitoria also affirmed that Spaniards had rights to
“travel in the lands in question.”133 These “universal” individual rights and the
powerful conception of private dominium they elaborated drew non-Christian,
non-Europeans into an emerging transactional global order organized around a
sacrosanct right to private property. 134 Vitoria’s insistence that Spaniards had
rights “to lawfully trade among the barbarians”135 must be understood in the
context of a new vision of an “empire of private rights”136—his understanding,
that is, of commerce as the principal terrain of conquest. When the Scholastics
acknowledged rights in Native peoples, as Professor Martti Koskenniemi has illuminated, they did so to expand the global trade network through conquest,
which included questions about the rights of Indigenous peoples as well as about
“just price,” usury, and emerging forms of credit-based ﬁnancing.137 Acknowledging rights in Native people in this way did not disrupt the hierarchies of conquest, since none of these theorists, nor the sovereigns who invoked them, extended any opportunity to non-Christian, non-Europeans to participate in
determining the meaning, scope, or enforcement of these rights. Further, the
right to trade in this global arena, Vitoria warned, meant that “the natives may

130.
131.

132.
133.

134.
135.
136.
137.

See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590-95 (1823).
See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 86-88 (explaining how the European “vision of Indian
normative divergence” undergirding the Laws of Burgos “mandated the diminution” of Native rights under natural law).
Id. at 97-108; ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2005).
WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 101 (quoting FRANCISCI DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI
RELECTIONES 151 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Inst. Wash. 1917)
(1557)).
Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 16-17 (2011).
Id. at 26 (quoting Francisco de Vitoria, On the American Indians, in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 231, 279-80 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991)).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 20-25.
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not prevent [Europeans’ entry and traffic].”138 Indeed, if they sought to block
trade, Europeans would be justiﬁed in waging “just war” against them—making
the theory of “just war” an enforcement mechanism for European commercial
rights.139
Following an understanding of rights highly inﬂuenced by Vitoria (conveyed
to the English-speaking public through George Peckham’s “True Reporte”), the
English pursued their “rights to trade” and to be accepted in this traffic by Native
peoples in America under this law of nations.140 In the absence of bulls authorizing their conquest, Holland, Sweden, France, and England evolved customary
practices of claims-making that included rites upon their arrival in non-Christian lands,141 but that also increasingly emphasized their possession, or actual
occupation of the lands.142 Benton and Straumann observe that this was a practical evolution: “possession constituted a claim to a thing that could easily be
evaluated” on a relative basis, making the question not “who had absolute title,”
but rather, “who of the two contenders had the better claim.” Further, “[i]nquiring about possession did not involve inquiring about the rightfulness of acquisition.”143 This practice of looking to possession referenced a consequence, rather
than a principle, of the Scholastics’ theories, but proved so essential to the British

138.

139.
140.

141.

142.

143.

ANGHIE, supra note 132, at 20 (quoting FRANCISCI DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI
RELECTIONES 151 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Inst. Wash. 1917)
(1557)); Koskenniemi, supra note 134, at 26.
Koskenniemi, supra note 134, at 28-29; WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 107.
WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 166-69; see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 122, at 17-19 (explaining
England’s compliance with “the international law of Discovery” as a means to strengthen its
claims in foreign lands).
Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 15-21
(2005); see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 122, at 20-21 (describing how European countries,
including England and France, “claimed lands by hanging and burying plates and coins, and
painting signs and planting their crosses and ﬂags in the soil recognized”); PATRICIA SEED,
CEREMONIES OF POSSESSION IN EUROPE’S CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD, 1492-1640, at 6973, 101-02 (1995) (describing rituals followed by Spain and Portugal in making claims to the
New World).
See MILLER ET AL., supra note 122, at 18-19 (describing how England and France added to the
Discovery Doctrine “the element of actual occupancy and possession as a requirement to establish European claims to title by Discovery and they applied this new element in their dealings with Spain and Portugal”); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 136-38 (describing England’s use of Ireland as a practice ground for its theory of colonization); HANS S. PAWLISCH,
SIR JOHN DAVIES AND THE CONQUEST OF IRELAND: A STUDY IN LEGAL IMPERIALISM 34 (1985)
(examining the English government’s use of judge-made law to consolidate its hold over Ireland in the early seventeenth century) .
Benton & Straumann, supra note 127, at 30.
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conquest of America, as this Article discusses at greater length below, 144 that
some two centuries later, Chief Justice Marshall made possession a key element
of Johnson’s rule of discovery: “Discovery gave title to the government by whose
subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments . . . [and] might be consummated by possession.”145 In retroactively incorporating this historical practice into his rule, Marshall found that “discovery”
claims established by possession had passed to the United States through treaties, purchases, and sovereign chains of title from Britain, Spain, and France.
Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall also incorporated the historical fact of the
racial dimensions of European conquest into the doctrinal rule. In a twist upon
the Scholastics’ universalism, that is, he explicitly subordinated Native title to
“absolute, ultimate” sovereign title of the United States. 146 While he did importantly affirm Native nations’ “full sovereignty” and original possession of
land in America,147 he invoked “discovery”—the law of conquest—to declare a
hierarchy that empowered the United States to deﬁne the parameters of Native
sovereignty—an ordering that Vitoria had left implicit. Again, the facts of the
case involved a pretense that the parties took title to the same land from different
parties,148 and the framework of competing titles facilitated Marshall’s clear elevation of U.S. sovereignty by conquest, the source of M’Intosh’s claim, above
that of the Piankeshaw and Illinois, from whose title Johnson’s purchase derived.
Critically, this pronouncement of superior jurisdiction speciﬁcally delineated the
order for trade or purchases of interests in land. Though superior, he argued,
U.S. title remained “subject . . . to the Indian title of occupancy,” 149 and the
United States had “an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy,
either by purchase or by conquest.”150 In Marshall’s schema, only the federal
government—and neither private entities nor states—could purchase land from
Native nations. Furthermore, the government only had the right to terminate

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

149.
150.

See infra Part IV.
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 545.
The land claims did not actually conﬂict in this case. The parties colluded in an attempt to
produce an answer on the legal question of valid chains of title. See ROBERTSON, supra note
121, at 45-75.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592.
Id. at 587.
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Native title in two ways—echoing the Scholastics—through consensual trade or
purchase, or by just war.151
In making the hierarchy of sovereignty dictated by conquest explicit, Chief
Justice Marshall also overtly justiﬁed this hierarchy with a theory of European
racial superiority, writing, for example, that “the character and religion of
[America’s] inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people
over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy.” 152 If
Johnson’s ﬁrst-in-time rule organized the agreement between European nations
to engage in conquest, then the decision also clariﬁed that the operative element
of the agreement was the racial hierarchy that gave the mission its impetus: without that distinction, Europeans would not have been able to deny the ﬁrst-intime entitlements of others.153 This reasoning does not render the ﬁrst-in-time
rule meaningless. Rather, it highlights the important aspects of the legal world
that conquest engendered—a world of property and sovereignty “acquired and
maintained by force,” 154 where laws channeled racial violence through the
ground rules of trade.155
Johnson’s rule continues to have many practical effects and consequences.
These effects are better understood today in the ﬁeld of Federal Indian law than
in property law, and with respect to lands held under Native dominium or that
151.

152.
153.

154.
155.

Justice Marshall later clariﬁed such war had to be defensive war. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546, 579-80 (1832); see also Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling
the Racial Context of Property Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALBANY GOV’T L.
REV. 1, 31 (2017) (glossing Worchester); Singer, supra note 22, at 773 (same). Similar propositions were elsewhere enshrined into the law. See NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787, reprinted in
1 UNITED STATES CODE, at LV-LVII (Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives ed., 2006); CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW DESKBOOK 30-35 (Larry Long & Clay Smith eds., 4th ed. 2008) (describing the Trade
and Intercourse Acts period of 1789 to 1887 as “faithfully reﬂect[ing] Chief Justice Marshall’s
basic conception of Indian tribes as semiautonomous entities . . . [that] were separated territorially and politically from other American society” and describing how the federal government under these Acts retained exclusive right to terminate Native title).
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
The Court “reject[ed] the doctrine of ﬁrst possession as giving rise to property
rights . . . [and] adopted, instead, the international rule of the doctrine of discovery.” Angela
R. Riley, The History of Native American Lands and the Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 369,
372 (2013).
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
Jesse Dukeminier calls Justice Marshall’s racial justiﬁcations “discomﬁting,” and explains that
“prior possession by aboriginal populations (which were sometimes called savage populations, or semi-civilized ones), was commonly thought not to matter.” DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
supra note 108, at 12. This legal ﬁction was also discomﬁting to Marshall, who, despite his
own racism, called European discovery claims “extravagant” and “pompous.” Johnson, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) at 590-91.
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become the subject of active legal disputes between tribal nations and others,
than those held by private parties or under public management in general. Johnson, which affirmed prohibitions on state and private purchases that Congress
enacted through its Trade and Intercourse Acts as early as 1790,156 prohibited
states and private entities from terminating Native title in ways that remain the
cause of action in many land disputes.157 Its identiﬁcation of the United States
as the only entity to which Native nations could freely transfer title to land158
created constraints that still apply to lands under Native dominium today, an area
larger than that held by California.159
Singer has repeatedly underscored that “all land titles in the United States
originate in Indian title.”160 Yet we have not fully understood the ramiﬁcations
of that fact for property law as traditionally conceived—a subject that largely focuses on the state and local, as well as some federal, laws governing interests in
land. As Singer has noted, the root of U.S. sovereignty in conquest raises serious
questions about the legitimacy and morality of all title claims in the nation.161
These title claims, as Johnson foregrounds, include claims to sovereign jurisdiction, beginning with the United States’s own claim to sovereignty, and including
all the subordinate jurisdictional claims that ﬂow from it—all the jurisdictions
that organize the operation of our laws in every ﬁeld. Examining the broader
legal historical context of Discovery, which Johnson itself highlights, also reveals
what distinguishes the U.S. rule from other iterations. The legitimacy questions
raised by Chief Justice Marshall’s construction of U.S. jurisdiction as a legacy of
European conquest are compounded by his decision to explicitly root jurisdiction in racial hierarchy, so that this hierarchy continues to underpin all jurisdiction in the country and determine the variable reach of national, tribal, state, and
local laws.

156.
157.

158.

159.
160.
161.

Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604.
A 2005 Supreme Court decision by Justice Ginsburg dismissing tribal claims on the basis of
the doctrine of laches placed substantial but not insuperable barriers on such claims. See City
of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217-18 (2005); see also Oneida Indian Nation
v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 663 (1974) (litigating federal jurisdiction).
Singer has likened this restraint on alienation to a right of ﬁrst refusal. Singer, supra note 151,
at 30-33. The United States also later became the only entity with the power to reacquire lands
for Native nations. See William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) Jurisdiction, 65 U. KAN. L.
REV. 415, 417 (2016).
Reese, supra note 15, at 558.
Singer, supra note 151, at 9 (emphasis omitted).
Speciﬁcally, the extent to which “our land titles originate in the dispossession of ﬁrst possessors . . . places subsequent titles in doubt” and may support demands for restoration and reparation. Id. at 9-10; see Singer, supra note 22, at 766 (“From a moral point of view, conquest
puts all current land titles in doubt . . . .”).

1099

the yale law journal

131:1062

2022

Here, I underscore that beyond establishing public-title claims in the United
States, conquest also resulted in profound practical and systemic consequences
for all privately held lands in the country. The import of private title to conquest
was already suggested by both the Scholastics’ focus on the commercial dimensions of conquest and the fact that Johnson’s principal question concerned private
title to lands. Nonetheless, property-law casebooks and curricula do not emphasize the signiﬁcant impact of Johnson’s Discovery Rule on commerce in the
United States, and more speciﬁcally, its land market. In general, the ﬁeld has
astonishingly little explored the enterprise of creating private-property claims in
the colonies that the Discovery Rule launched, or the unique ways that the English deployed law to do so. The following two Parts show how theories of labor
and possession contributed to settlers’ efforts, under the banner of Discovery, to
produce property in land and human beings in the American colonies.
iii. the labor of property creation in theory and practice
In its abstract form, the labor theory of property identiﬁes entitlement in the
party that invests their labor to create the property’s value.162 The theory, which
is based on the moral rationales of desert, efficiency, and the prevention of waste,
therefore explicitly references the processes by which property is produced. Using the most famous iteration of this theory in John Locke’s Second Treatise as a
touchstone, 163 this Part examines the ways that colonists mobilized the labor
theory and Locke’s references to property creation and the land market in the
colonies. While most casebooks brieﬂy mention Locke, they neither describe nor
connect Locke to colonists’ invocation of the labor theory to assert claims to
lands they deemed vacant or as going to “waste,” though this likely constitutes
the most signiﬁcant elaboration of the labor theory in American history. Further,
as I argue, Locke’s theory appears to reference colonists’ actual labors in expropriating resources and rendering them property. This history reveals the major
legal innovations in property law that reshaped the foundations of the property
system in the American colonies. It also underscores how law contributed to the
processes of colonization and enslavement by racializing nonwhite peoples and
introducing new institutions to facilitate the expropriations that creating property in land and human beings required.
Section III.A reviews the signiﬁcant literature that contextualizes Locke’s account of property creation in the Second Treatise within the histories of conquest

162.

Typically, property-law courses teach the theory of labor and investment as a source of entitlement using the case International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
163. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689).
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and slavery. This work, whose insights casebooks still largely omit, details
Locke’s active participation in the colonial project, and highlights that his iteration of the labor theory was just one articulation of widespread colonial ideas. It
demonstrates that the labor theory both erases enslaved labor and elaborates racist evolutionary ideas about Native people; and further, on this basis, that it intrinsically links racial ideology with ideas about the value of land to argue that
European improvements to the land justiﬁed their conquest. These powerful and
lasting stereotypes, indeed, prompted Chief Justice Marshall, some two centuries later, to pronounce in Johnson that: “To leave [Native people] in possession
of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness.”164
This literature has rightly contested these colonial racial ideologies, and speciﬁcally the denigration of Native people and their land use. To add to their analysis of the Second Treatise’s ideology, here, I add that the activities Locke referenced also correlated to speciﬁc institutions and systems that colonists developed
to produce private-property claims in the colonies. “Till[ing], [p]lant[ing],” and
“inclos[ing],”165 for example, constituted speciﬁc requirements that settlers had
to fulﬁll under colonial “headright” laws, which granted them ownership of a
speciﬁc number of acres if they occupied and cultivated that land for a term of
years. Further, the ideological link between race and value that scholars have
identiﬁed also indexes an actual practice of making monetary value dependent on
white possession, as the English began to build markets in land and slaves where
none existed before.
In Section III.B, I turn to the labor of property creation in the colonies that
led colonists to introduce many of the core institutions of American property law
today. Colonists invested signiﬁcant legal labor in building new institutions and
practices to create monetary value in land, in addition to the agricultural labor
commonly recognized as a referent of the theory. The innovations that sprang
up in colonial laws under the aegis of Discovery in the colonies gave its racial
hierarchy practical and ideological substance. They included, for example, laws
that made slavery racial, hereditary, and perpetual—producing property and race
in a manner that exhibits how racialization both facilitated making property
claims to people and justiﬁed the violence inherent in constructing that relationship. They also included the development of systems for organizing colonial land
holdings against Native land claims, such as centralized title registries holding
records of individual ownership claims, surveying or measuring lands into rectangular plots, and easy foreclosure. These novel laws, institutions, and practices, as I show, shaped American society as they changed the meaning of property and set its course toward our present.

164.
165.

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
LOCKE, supra note 163, at 290-91.
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A. The Labor Theory and Property Value
The labor theory is not merely an abstract story about creating property
value, but a historical legal theory that played a major role in the creation of actual property and property value in colonial America. A signiﬁcant literature has
critiqued this theory’s role in colonization, especially the ways that its various
iterations associated white labor with property value and concomitantly discounted the value of nonwhite labor. This literature has also examined how colonists in fact justiﬁed their occupation of Native nations’ lands by suggesting
that they alone, or in superior ways, labored on the land. This Section ﬁrst reviews how scholars have debunked these claims about Native people and Native
forms of land tenure and unmasked the labor theory’s racial ideology. To this
account of ideological production, I then add a complementary account of property production: legal history, I argue, helps us to see that Locke’s theory was
also descriptively accurate with respect to colonists’ property-making activities.
The very practices that colonists ideologically portrayed as evolutionarily beyond
Native peoples also, for example, constituted requirements under laws that recruited settlers to the colonies on the condition that they occupy and cultivate
land. The link between European presence and value contained in the racial ideology of “improvement,” too, ﬁnds a practical corollary in a land market where
lands were worthless to colonists when they remained in the possession of tribal
nations.
The scholarly interventions that initiated the reassessment of Locke’s Second
Treatise in light of Locke’s role in the histories of conquest and enslavement only
appeared—in an astonishing example of the persistence of erasure—three centuries after its publication,166 despite the volume of commentaries the work has
generated and the inﬂuence it has had.167 As this scholarship highlights, Locke
was an aide to the Earl of Shaftesbury, secretary to the Lord Proprietors of Carolina and the Council of Trade and Plantations, and a member of the Board of

166.

E.g., DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 118-21 (1966);
James Farr, “So Vile and Miserable an Estate”: The Problem of Slavery in Locke’s Political Thought,
14 POL. THEORY 263, 265 (1986); Herman Lebovics, The Uses of America in Locke’s Second
Treatise of Government, 47 J. HIST. IDEAS 567, 578 (1986); JAMES TULLY, Rediscovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights, in AN APPROACH TO ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY:
LOCKE IN CONTEXTS 137, 140 (Quentin Skinner ed. 1993); Barbara Arneil, Trade, Plantations,
and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism, 55 J. HIST. IDEAS 591, 607-09
(1994); Wayne Glausser, Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade, 51 J. HIST. IDEAS 199,
211-12 (1990).
167. This inﬂuence extended to the Founders—especially Thomas Jefferson, who drew on the Second Treatise to draft the Declaration of Independence.
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Trade, the part of the English government responsible for colonial administration.168 He was an investor in the Company of Merchant Adventurers and the
Royal Africa Company,169 and wrote memoranda and policy recommendations
on various colonies, settlement projects, and the institutions of government and
property in America, including the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina170 and
a 1698 reform proposal for Virginia. 171 These scholars have also underscored
how Locke discounted and ignored the labor of African and Native peoples in
the Second Treatise, which contains perhaps the most famous iteration of the labor theory: “Whatsoever then [one] removes out of the State that Nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.”172
The most profound erasure accomplished by Locke’s selective application of
the labor theory according to the racial hierarchy of Discovery may be the utter
omission of enslaved labor from his account. Though the Second Treatise offers a
paean to the way “a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates [Land],” Locke never
mentions the enslaved Africans who principally engaged in the agricultural labor
of “tilling” and “planting” in America to produce colonial cash crops, including
tobacco, rice, and cotton.173 Perhaps referencing both contemporary arguments
for enslaving Native people and also the theories of conquest that gave birth to
the transatlantic slave trade, Locke does justify slavery on the basis of just war.174
But his account of the labor of property creation contains no trace mentions of
the labor of the people who were treated as property, whose forced importation
to the Americas began in the early sixteenth century by Spain and Portugal to
supplement the labor of enslaved Native peoples in the Caribbean, and later, the
mainland.175

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

175.

TULLY, supra note 166, at 140.
Id.
BANNER, supra note 24, at 47; David Armitage, John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of
Government, 32 POL. THEORY 602, 603 (2004).
Holly Brewer, Slavery, Sovereignty, and “Inheritable Blood”: Reconsidering John Locke and the Origins of American Slavery, 122 AM. HIST. REV. 1038, 1061-66 (2017).
JOHN LOCKE, supra note 163, at 288.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 283-85; see also Brad Hinshelwood, The Carolinian Context of John Locke’s Theory of Slavery, 41 POL. THEORY 562, 564 (2013) (discussing how Locke used the concept of just war); The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114 (1825) (justifying the slave trade). Holly Brewer has
more recently argued that “Locke’s support for slavery was weaker than his critics have implied.” Brewer, supra note 171, at 1052.
THOMAS, supra note 123, at 92-113.
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The English, French, and Dutch joined the African slave trade in the early
seventeenth century.176 The ﬁrst record of English colonists’ purchase of Africans was in Virginia in 1619.177 In the 1630s, records of enslaved Africans appeared in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and Massachusetts constructed the slave
ship that ﬁrst brought people from Africa to Connecticut in 1637.178 In the 1660s
and through the 1680s, the number of enslaved persons in the colonies burgeoned as the Crown promoted African enslaved labor through its monopoly
company 179 and colonists increasingly built their trade with Barbados. 180 In
1683, Colonel Nicholas Spencer, Secretary of Virginia, boasted that “Blacks can
make [Tobacco] cheaper than Whites;” 181 between 1670 and 1698, the Black
population increased from 2,000 to 5,000,182 and by 1710, the number of enslaved Black people in the colony was estimated at “upwards 15,000.”183 In Professor Anthony Parent’s words, “Virginia had become a slave society.”184
By contrast, in keeping with Vitoria’s inclusive model of conquest, Locke
does acknowledge some fundamental rights to property in Native peoples in the
Second Treatise. He argues, for example, that “the wild Indian,” like all others,
derives property rights from his labor in the hunter-gatherer context: if he harvests a nut or gives chase to a deer to kill it, he too is entitled to “the Fruit, or
Venison.”185 However, Locke also acknowledges that his main purpose in the exposition is to describe rights in land, “the chief matter of Property being now not
176.
177.
178.
179.

180.
181.

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 153-62.
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 20 (1978).
THOMAS, supra note 123, at 177. See generally WARREN, supra note 8 (discussing the importance
of slavery in early New England society).
Perhaps motivated by a desire to preserve English servant labor for the home country, Charles
II “‘invite[d] all of his subjects to subscribe to a new joint stock,’ the Royal African Company.”
ANTHONY S. PARENT, JR., FOUL MEANS: THE FORMATION OF A SLAVE SOCIETY IN VIRGINIA
1660-1740, at 60 (2003) (quoting an eighteenth-century collection).
Id. at 67.
Id. at 60 (quoting Letter from Lord Culpeper to the Committee for . . . Plantations (Sept. 20,
1683), enclosed with Letter from Secretary Spencer to the Committee for . . . Plantations (July
16, 1683) (received Sept. 28, 1683), in ENTRY BOOK OF LETTERS, COMMISSIONS, INSTRUCTIONS, CHARTERS, WARRANTS, PATENTS AND GRANTS RELATING TO VIRGINIA, AND ESPECIALLY
TO THE PLANT CUTTING DISTURBANCES, THE FORFEITURE OF LORD CULPEPER’S PATENT AND
THE APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR OF LORD HOWARD OF EFFINGHAM 138 (1681-1685), microformed in Public Record Office Class C.O. 5/1356, Reel 28 (Va. Colonial Rec. Project)).
Id. at 74.
Id. at 79.
Id.
LOCKE, supra note 172, at 287, 289.
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the Fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts that subsist on it, but the Earth it self.”186
Property in land is analogous, he explains: “I think it is plain, that Property in
that too is acquired as the former. As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves,
Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property. He by his Labour
does, as it were, inclose it from the Common.”187
Though land is analogous to other forms of property here, it also constitutes
the threshold where the racial hierarchy of conquest and the evolutionary theory
it spawned found a distinction. Locke’s speciﬁc description of the labor of enclosure and property creation categorically excluded “the wild Indian,” who, he
wrote, “knows no Inclosure, and is still a tenant in common.”188 Scholars have
trenchantly critiqued the racism and inaccuracy of this characterization of Native
people’s agricultural practices and traditions of land tenure. Professor Natsu
Taylor Saito writes that Locke’s evolutionary narrative was “simply counterfactual, and the settlers knew it.”189 Professor Stuart Banner and others have shown
that the English notion that Native people left land to “lye waste and free” contradicted the numerous written observations colonists left describing the Native
towns, villages, and “carefully cultivated” orderly crop systems they found up
and down the Eastern Seaboard. 190 In Jamestown, John Smith reported that
“[e]ach household knoweth their owne lands & gardens;” 191 and in 1709 in

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

191.

Id. at 290-91.
Id.
Id. at 287.
Natsu Taylor Saito, Race and Decolonization: Whiteness as Property in the American Settler Colonial Project, 31 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 31, 52 (2015).
BANNER, supra note 24, at 19, 30; see Saito, supra note 189, at 52; KAREN ORDAHL KUPPERMAN,
SETTLING WITH INDIANS: THE MEETINGS OF ENGLISH AND INDIAN CULTURES IN AMERICA,
1580-1640, at 81-84 (1980); SAILORS NARRATIVES OF VOYAGES ALONG THE NEW ENGLAND
COAST, 1524-1624, at 19 (George Parker Winship ed., 1905); THOMAS HARIOT, A BRIEFE AND
TRUE REPORT OF THE NEW FOUND LAND OF VIRGINIA 19-20 (London 1588); THE ENGLISH
NEW ENGLAND VOYAGES, 1602-1608, at 88-89, 183-84 (David B. Quinn & Alison M. Quinn
eds., 1983); JOHN SMITH, A TRUE RELATION OF SUCH OCCURRENCES AND ACCIDENTS OF NOATE AS HATH HAPNED IN VIRGINIA (London 1608); THE JAMESTOWN VOYAGES UNDER THE
FIRST CHARTER, 1606-1609, at 173 (Philip L. Barbour ed., 1969); WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF
PLYMOUTH PLANTATION, 1620-1647, at 85 (Samuel Eliot Morison ed., 1952) (1630-1650);
Linda S. Cordell & Bruce D. Smith, Indigenous Farmers, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE
NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS 201, 201-66 (Bruce G. Trigger & Wilcomb E. Washburn
eds., 1996); PETER THOMAS, IN THE MAELSTROM OF CHANGE: THE INDIAN TRADE AND CULTURAL PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE CONNECTICUT VALLEY 1635-1665, at 103-13 (1979).
John Smith, A Map of Virginia, in THE JAMESTOWN VOYAGES UNDER THE FIRST CHARTER,
1606-1609, supra note 190, at 355, 371; accord ALEXANDER WHITAKER, GOOD NEWS FROM VIRGINIA 26-27 (London 1613); Edward Winslow, Good Newes from New England, in CHRONICLES
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North Carolina, John Lawson observed that Native groups “have no Fence to
part one anothers Lots in their Corn-Fields; but every Man knows his own, and
it scarce ever happens, that they rob one another of so much as an Ear of
Corn.”192 Several scholars have highlighted that English property arrangements
of the time were strikingly similar to many Native groups’ practices, which allocated farming plots to families and maintained common resource areas for the
community; the English, like some Native communities, also planted ﬁelds together and separated different families’ rows by a narrow strip of grass.193 While
colonists imported ﬁxed-ﬁeld agriculture practices from England, as Peter
Thomas notes, swidden systems, like those used by Native groups in the Connecticut River Valley and “throughout the world[,] have frequently produced
equal, or even higher, returns than ﬁelds under continuous cultivation.”194
These scholars rightly show that colonists, in many iterations of the labor
theory, misrepresented Native people and their agricultural practices. For in suggesting that their possession diminished the value of lands, Locke merely echoed
older, well-known colonial accounts that argued English occupation would improve the lands and increase their value for all of humanity. Puritan preacher
Robert Gray, for example, proclaimed in 1609:
[T]hese savages have no particular propriety in any part or parcel of that
country, but only a general residency there, as wild beasts in the forest;
for they range and wander up and down the country without any law or
government, being led only by their own lusts and sensuality.195

OF THE PILGRIM FATHERS 361-62 (Boston, Alexander Young ed., 1844); WILLIAM PENN, A LETTER FROM WILLIAM PENN . . . TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE FREE SOCIETY OF TRADERS 6 (London, Andrew Sowle ed., 1683); JOHN LAWSON, A NEW VOYAGE TO CAROLINA 19 (London
1709); JOHN SMITH, A DESCRIPTION OF NEW ENGLAND 33-34 (London, Robert Clerke ed.,
1616); WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 211 (citing THE JAMESTOWN VOYAGES UNDER THE FIRST
CHARTER, 1606-1609, supra note 190, at 371).
192.

LAWSON, supra note 191, at 179.
See NANCY SHOEMAKER, A STRANGE LIKENESS: BECOMING RED AND WHITE IN EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY NORTH AMERICA 13-34 (2004); R. DOUGLAS HURT, INDIAN AGRICULTURE IN AMERICA: PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 65-67 (1987); Anthony F.C. Wallace, Political Organization
and Land Tenure Among the Northeastern Indians, 1600-1830, 13 SW. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 301-21
(1957); WILLIAM BARTRAM, TRAVELS THROUGH NORTH & SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, EAST &
WEST FLORIDA 325 (Philadelphia 1791); John Bellers, An Essay Toward the Improvement of Physick, in JOHN BELLERS 1654-1725: QUAKER ECONOMIST AND SOCIAL REFORMER (A. Ruth Fry ed.,
1935).
194. THOMAS, supra note 190, at 113.
195. WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 211 (quoting ROBERT GRAY, A GOOD SPEED TO VIRGINIA [25-26]
(London 1609)).
193.
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Similarly, in 1629, Massachusetts Bay founder John Winthrop wrote, “This
savage people ruleth over many lands without title or property, for they enclose
no ground.” 196 William Penn called lands in America “waste or uncultivated
Country.”197 Many scholars have observed that these justiﬁcations served to obscure different circumstances that the English exploited to claim that Native nations were not using land. In actuality, many English settled on the grounds of
villages decimated by new European diseases, or claimed ﬁelds temporarily out
of use due to Native communities’ crop rotation or preservation of hunting
grounds.198
In a range of arguments that blurred together or became interchangeable,
colonists suggested that Native occupancy “did not involve an adequate amount
of ‘labor’ to perfect a ‘property’ interest.”199 They argued that Native people were
not using the lands, that their use was not sufficient to justify their claims, or
that there were no people on the lands—the land was vacuum domicilium—to
make a claim at all.200 Linking racial ideology and racial presence to conceptions
about the value of land justiﬁed dispossessing and displacing non-Christian
non-Europeans, or carrying out the mandate of “discovery,” with lasting effects.
The rationales of desert, efficiency, and the prevention of waste associated with
the labor theory today derive from these arguments that colonists were entitled
to the land because of the value they gave it. This understanding of value, in
turn, is therefore inseparable from the colonial ideas that Native and African
peoples were, by nature, closer to beasts than humans.
At the same time, Locke’s and other iterations of the labor theory also describe a reality of practices and systems that colonists used to create value in lands
for themselves. Attending to these processes reveals the legal design that organized

196.

John Winthrop, General Considerations for the Plantation in New England, in 2 WINTHROP PAPERS, 1623-1630, at 120 (Mass. Hist. Soc’y ed., 1931).

197.

WILLIAM PENN, A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 1 (London 1686); see
also JOHN COTTON, GOD’S PROMISE TO HIS PLANTATIONS 4 (London 1634) (asserting colonists’
right to occupy “vacant place[s]”).
198. See TULLY, supra note 166, at 138-39. As Banner notes, “[e]veryone knew that land could still
be owned [in England] even if it was not being farmed, and indeed even if it was not being
used or occupied at all.” BANNER, supra note 24, at 33.
199. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 108, at 16 (quoting Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and
Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3 n.4 (1983)).
200. The preacher Robert Gray concluded therefore that Native people claimed no property: that
“[t]here is not meum and tuum amongst them,” and “if the whole land should be taken from
them, there is not a man that can complain of any particular wrong done unto him.” WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 211 (quoting ROBERT GRAY, A GOOD SPEED TO VIRGINIA [26] (London
1609)).
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and spurred this labor. As Chief Justice Marshall describes in Johnson v. M’Intosh,
under Discovery, each European nation pursued property creation in the colonies differently,201 and the English uniquely relied on settlement to take possession of lands. However, in the early period, English colonial administrators faced
perennial problems in recruiting the numbers needed to actually occupy the
lands and consummate their collective claims through possession under the Discovery Doctrine.202 Across the Eastern Seaboard, colonies found it virtually impossible to recruit populations for their settlements because of the dauntingly
dangerous nature of the venture 203 until they adopted some variation of the
headright system. 204 Headright laws granted individuals “rights” to a certain
number of acres (often ﬁfty) in exchange for every person or “head” that they
brought to the colony who would clear, cultivate, and defend that land over a
term of years.205 In other words, they promised private title to settlers to land
that they occupied and “improved.” The activities Locke enumerates—“tilling,”
“planting,” and “[i]nclosure”—all speciﬁcally constituted homesteading requirements in headright laws, which helped engineer the waves of migration
that “peopled North America” and caused the colonial population to burgeon in
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.206
For colonial governments and companies, headrights killed several birds
with one stone: they built up the population of settlers, produced property held
under private title as well as the colonial jurisdiction, and tended to expel Native

201.

Marshall speciﬁed that, according to the principle of noninterference, the ways that Europeans
interacted with Native peoples to take possession of lands “were to be regulated by themselves.” 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
202. “In the early period, settlement was the end desired, and to further this, lands were freely
bestowed.” AMELIA FORD, COLONIAL PRECEDENTS OF OUR NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM AS IT EXISTED IN 1800, at 95 (1910).
203. See id. at 81; BERNARD BAILYN, THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 81-83 (1986).
204. FORD, supra note 202, at 96-98.
205. In Virginia, settlers had to “build a house, plant one acre, and keep stock for one year,” within
three years, or risking forfeiting the land; in Massachusetts, settlers had to “tak[e] actual possession . . . build[] a house of certain size . . . and clear[] ﬁve to eight acres ﬁt for mowing and
tilling.” Id. at 103.
206. The phrase “peopling North America” comes from BAILYN, supra note 203. See also BERNARD
BAILYN, THE BARBAROUS YEARS: THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: THE CONFLICT
OF CIVILIZATIONS, 1600-1675 (2012) (using the same phrase). Elsewhere, I have argued that
the headright system, Native removal, and the forced migration of Africans should be understood as an early part of immigration-law history in America. See K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation
Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1882-87 (2019). Here, I suggest it is part of the development
of American property law and its famous, persistent homesteading principle.
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nations from their lands. Dispossession and displacement were critical for converting the lands into property, while actual occupation, planting, and tilling had
the effects of spreading disease and chasing away game.207 As settlement made
life more difficult for Native people, it became easier for private individuals and
governments to purchase land from them: “A [N]ative population decimated by
sickness and deprived of sources of food and other necessities had little bargaining power. The title of occupancy went for a pittance.”208 Moreover, colonies
made grants of land to men “able to defend it . . . to secure protection without
the expense of a standing army.”209 Military-aged men who were ready for combat and who had served in wars against Native nations received especially large
grants.210 Even before the Revolutionary War ended, at least three states adopted
headright systems to help populate their backcountry, including Virginia and
North Carolina, as well as Massachusetts, which offered settlers one hundred
acres “on the sole condition of clearing sixteen acres in four years.”211 Later, the
United States adopted the strategy of incentivizing settlement with promises of
land, though at a price, to help it extinguish Native title in western territories
with the famous Homestead Act of 1862.212
Throughout this long, mythologized history, the ideology of the labor theory—the idea that white people, through their occupation, brought improvements in the form of civilization to the continent—propelled and justiﬁed these
invasions and expansion of the national territory. At the same time, as a matter
of fact, lands and people in America acquired value for colonists—that is, they
became property—when they came into the possession of whites. More bluntly,
lands became a monetary equivalent upon Native removal from them, actual or
projected,213 just as human beings became a monetary-value equivalent, in this
economy, upon their subjugation. They ﬁrst acquired monetary value upon a

207.

See, e.g., Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of
American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1154 (2000); WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN
THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 85-89, 100-107 (2003);
Park, supra note 206, at 1891-97.
208. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 108, at 18.
209. FORD, supra note 202, at 103-04.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 102.
212. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392; see also Kades, supra note 207, at 1072, 1172-73
(explaining how the U.S. government used the Homestead Act to strategically incentivize settlement in particular areas); Paul Wallace Gates, The Homestead Law in an Incongruous Land
System, 41 AM. HIST. REV. 652, 653 (1936) (attributing rapid Western settlement to the Homestead Act).
213. Preemption rights had monetary value because of future projections about removal. See infra
Section III.B.
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transfer of possession that entailed expropriation, which brought them into markets. The next Section explores how property law created those markets—surely
a question of interest to the ﬁeld—or in other words, how colonists evolved new
property laws, practices, and institutions to create the powerful, endogenously
grown American property-law system of today.
B. Producing Property, Property Law, and Property Institutions in the Colonies
Colonists’ creation of new markets in lands and enslaved persons, where
none existed before, was the main enterprise of the context in which the labor
theory operated, and the project for which it was mobilized. This Section turns
to additional examples of the laws, practices, and institutions that colonists cultivated to treat human beings and expropriated land as new forms of property.
For one, colonists developed laws that produced race as a key element of property, as they made the status of enslavement racial, hereditary, and perpetual, and
disengaged it from the mission of conversion. They also created what Professor
Claire Priest has called “ground-level” legal institutions214 that facilitated the expropriation of land from Native people and its consolidation in the colonial community as property. These institutions, which constitute the basic elements of
the American property system still, include the rectangular survey, through
which colonists measured out enclosures of land as commodities for the market,
the centralized registry, through which they organized their collective interests
in land, and easy foreclosure, which upended the ancient English distinction between real and chattel property to facilitate land dispossession, and thereby make
land an opening to a stream of credit.
Signiﬁcantly, these innovations in property created a social world riven by
racial violence as they fostered the rapid growth of colonial markets by producing novel commodity forms in enslaved people and expropriated land. Launched
by the racial hierarchy of conquest, this hierarchy also informed the practices of
racial violence that grew these colonial markets, and the racial ideologies that
colonists elaborated to justify this use of violence. The ways that racial ideologies
concerning Native and African people functioned in the colonies is too complex
a phenomenon to describe comprehensively here.215 However, one of the great-
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est factors in its development was the legal transformation of African enslavement into an emphatically racial, hereditary, and perpetual “predicament”216 disengaged from the Christian mission of discovery. The American institution of
African chattel slavery would have a profound effect on the world that cultivated
it. The anti-Blackness it entrenched came to provide a blueprint for the racialization of other nonwhites, both who lived in the colonies, and who arrived in
subsequent waves of migration long after. Further, in developments beyond the
scope of this Article, it would eventually spur a reorganization of property law to
circumvent Black property rights and shape the land market after abolition.
All the colonies developed some dependence on the labor of enslaved Africans, especially in the South, and passed laws to evolve this form of subjugation.
Notwithstanding original justiﬁcations for the slave trade through theories of
Christian just war, in 1667, for example, Virginia passed a law providing that
baptism could not affect the bondage of Black or Native people, ensuring that
“the skin color and not the heathenism of their black and Indian slaves [] ‘justiﬁed’ their subjugation.”217 Other laws ensured the racial, hereditary, and perpetual nature of enslavement in America by tying it to kinship and segregation in
ways that, as Professor Jennifer L. Morgan writes, “legally complete[d]” the association between Blackness and forced labor. 218 Colonies dictated that freeborn women who married enslaved men would be enslaved during their husbands’ lifetimes, and that children born from such marriages would be slaves for
life. In 1662, Virginia passed a law stating that “all children borne in this country
shalbe held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother,”219 contravening the English common-law rule that status followed that of the father.

216.

See JENNIFER L. MORGAN, RECKONING WITH SLAVERY: GENDER, KINSHIP, AND CAPITALISM IN
THE EARLY BLACK ATLANTIC 5-6 (2021) (discussing her preference for the word “predicament”

to the stasis implied by “condition”).
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 177, at 36-37.
218. JENNIFER L. MORGAN, LABORING WOMEN: REPRODUCTION AND GENDER IN NEW WORLD
SLAVERY 72 (2004); see also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 177, at 40-47 (providing an overview
of colonial-era laws that imposed additional servitude on female servants who had children
out of wedlock, as well as laws that tied the status of an interracial child to that of the unfree
mother, perpetuating servitude); JORDAN, supra note 215, at 44-45 (describing colonial-era
antimiscegenation statutes and their contributions to racial debasement). These conditions
did not evolve immediately or consistently with the importation of Africans to the mainland.
See LINDA M. HEYWOOD & JOHN K. THORNTON, CENTRAL AFRICANS, ATLANTIC CREOLES, AND
THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAS, 1585-1660, at 323-27 (2007); KATHLEEN M. BROWN,
GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 107-08 (1996).
219. Act XII: Negro Womens Children to Serve According to the Condition of the Mother (Dec.
1662), reprinted in 2 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION
217.
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This rule of partus sequitur ventrem—literally, “off-spring follows the womb”—
became a governing principle of property across the colonies, together with antimiscegenation laws. It ascended to paramount importance in the U.S. domestic
slave trade after the importation of enslaved Africans was abolished in 1808 and
the rape of Black women became a key means of property increase. Virginia
Judge Gholson in 1831 argued to the State Legislature, “‘Partus sequitur ventrem’
is coeval with the existence of the right of property itself.”220
These forms of legal debasement, key to the construction of Black laborers
as property in contradistinction to white servants, helped “congeal[]” and
“harden[] categories of racial subjugation,” as Morgan has recently observed.221
This evolving anti-Blackness affected free as well as enslaved Black people, and
also inﬂuenced evolving colonial racial ideas about Native people and the ways
colonists interacted with nonwhite groups in general. Colonial legal codes increasingly grouped nonwhites together to limit their mobility, freedom of assembly, freedom to bear arms, and capacities in court, among other things.222
This general racialization grew more pronounced over time as the colonial population grew exponentially and power relations between colonists and Native
nations shifted to favor this aggressive new force.223
This growing racialization also changed the dynamics of transactions for
lands between Native people and colonists, which rooted all chains of title in the
United States in Native title, over time. At the beginning of the colonial period,
Europeans’ ability to impose such regulations was challenged by the powerful
presence of the existing sovereigns.224 Much to the chagrin of colonial company
heads and administrators, the English understood upon arrival in Plymouth and
Jamestown that they had no hope of taking lands by force from the Wampanoag
or the Powhatan Confederacy.225 Notwithstanding ideas about vacuum domicilium, colonists in Virginia, Massachusetts, and the Carolinas formally recognized

ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR
1619, at 170 (New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823).
DAINA RAMEY BERRY, THE PRICE FOR THEIR POUND OF FLESH: THE VALUE OF THE ENSLAVED,
FROM WOMB TO GRAVE, IN THE BUILDING OF A NATION 11 (2017).
MORGAN, supra note 216, at 1-2.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 177, at 39-41, 76-82.
SHOEMAKER, supra note 193, at 142 (observing that English stereotypes about Native people’s
inferiority did not congeal in emphatically racial terms until the eighteenth century).
See generally GREER, supra note 122, at 65, 65-96 (2018) (“[European] newcomers formed their
settlements within established native tenurial regimes.”).
See, e.g., Robert Cushman, Reasons and Considerations Touching the Lawfulnesse of Removing
Out of England into the Parts of America, reprinted in THE JOURNAL OF THE PILGRIMS AT PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND 101, 105 (New York 1849); WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 206-08.
OF
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Native title from the earliest days of settlement. In many instances, they arrived
with instructions to “purchase their tytle, that wee may avoyde the least scruple
of intrusion.” 226 Colonists sought permission to occupy lands from groups
clearly in control of them, and called such payment a matter of “Prudence &
Christian Charity Least otherwise the Indians might have destroyed [the] ﬁrst
planters.”227 Moreover, local French colonists were paying for these rights, making it difficult for the English not to do so—and they found few reasons to object
to this way of cheaply obtaining both occupation rights and a foothold for their
claims to title.228 The variety of strategies they used meant that contradictory
theories of conquest became arguments in the alternative. The Virginia Company, for example, proclaimed their settlement legal because “there is roome sufﬁcient in the land . . . for them, and us . . . [and] because they have violated the
lawe of nations . . . . But chieﬂie because Paspehay, one of their Kings, sold unto
us for copper, land to inherit and inhabite.”229 In 1707, the New Hampshire Assembly similarly argued that upon their arrival, the lands “were not onely then
Vacuum Domicilium but a miserable desert,” but also that their Ancestors “all
along informed and assured us the said Lands were honestly and justly purchased.”230
English colonists thus recognized Native property rights from the beginning,
in practice, if not always, in theory. As Banner points out, “[t]here is no actual
difference between respecting others’ property rights and treating them as if one
is respecting their property rights. That’s what a property right is—the
knowledge that one will be treated as a property owner.”231 This practice ﬁt comfortably within the mandate to take possession that Johnson v. M’Intosh described: a grant from the Crown did not consummate title, but merely authorized colonists to seek possession. They did so in a variety of ways well226.
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BANNER, supra note 24, at 24 (quoting instructions from the earliest settlers of Massachusetts); see also id. at 39-43 (arguing that the English respected Indian property rights and continued to do so because their chains of title originated in Native title).
Councells Opinions Concerning Coll. Nicholls Pattent and Indian Purchases, in 13 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 487 (Albany, Weed,
Parsons & Co. 1881).
BANNER, supra note 24, at 39-40 (quoting ARCHIBALD KENNEDY, THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING
AND PRESERVING THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE INDIANS TO THE BRITISH INTEREST, CONSIDERED 6
(New York 1751)).
Id. at 20-21 (quoting A TRUE DECLARATION OF THE ESTATE OF THE COLONIE IN VIRGINIA 10-11
(London 1610)); JEREMY DUPERTUIS BANGS, INDIAN DEEDS: LAND TRANSACTIONS IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 1620-1691, at 20 (2002).
BANNER, supra note 24, at 22 (quoting DANIEL GOOKIN, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF THE INDIANS IN NEW ENGLAND 39 (Boston 1792)).
Id. at 42.
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established by then: establishing municipalities,232 exercising legal jurisdiction
over Native people in their own lands,233 and purchasing land, often coercively,
and in huge tracts.234 The activity of purchase anchored all chains of title in the
country in Native title, as Johnson later acknowledged. Evidence indicates that
the practice of memorializing these payments with recorded deeds did not become established for many decades,235 due partly to the impermanent nature of
settlement at the time; colonists also preferred, when it was still possible, to ﬁnd
new lands rather than engaging in conﬂict over speciﬁc lands with one another,
and their inexact dealings may have stimulated more rapid settlement.236 Surveys were haphazard as a result of colonists following “freedom of location” to
choose the most desirable lands, although to a lesser extent in New England than
in the South or Middle Atlantic.
By the 1660s, as settlements grew more crowded, land disputes increased
due to overlapping grants, claims, and a diminishing ability to simply spread
out.237 Because their records were as haphazard as their surveys, colonists began
to construct records of events that were many years past. It became fairly common practice to call one another to testify about purchases they had made several
decades earlier as proof of title, and recording retroactive quitclaim deeds based
on such testimony.238 The town of Andover, Massachusetts, for example, tried
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See Benton & Straumann, supra note 127, at 29-37; Lyle Koehler, Red-White Power Relations
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See BANNER, supra note 24, at 140.
See, e.g., 1 THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 383 (Lawrence Shaw Mayo ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1936) (1764); David Thomas
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Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 137, 144 (1974); Konig, supra,
at 137 (describing how in Essex, Massachusetts, “order and regularity were not imposed on
land arrangements until after 1660”).
See, e.g., Konig, supra note 235, at 140, 146.
See id. at 149 (“[L]and is not a limitless resource.”).
See, e.g., id. at 153, 168 (“It was not unusual in these cases for both parties to bring men to
court to attest to usage of the land many decades before, when they had been boys.”);
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to settle disputes over land by appointing townsmen to investigate and record
transactions “to be esteemed and accounted as valid and authentick, as if they
had been entered and recorded at the time when they were graunted, though the
day and year of such graunts be not mentioned nor remembered.”239 Questions
about the legitimacy of colonial charters and colonists’ claims vis-à-vis Native
groups lingered through the seventeenth century, and pointing to chains of title
originating in Native title became increasingly important for colonists in conﬁrming their own title claims against the world. When Governor Edmund Andros of the Dominion of New England sought in 1686 to reverse previously settled policy by invalidating all titles that could not be traced back to government
grants, he caused a storm of protest from New Englanders, some of whom declared that if purchase from Indians could not serve as the root of a valid land
title, “no Man was owner of a Foot of Land in all the Colony.”240 Each New England coastal town subsequently sought to negotiate retroactive “quitclaim” deeds
with “known” descendants of the Native leaders who were contemporaries of the
ﬁrst settlers, to ensure they extinguished Native title on the record.241
To construct these chains of title, these early title disputes inspired a consolidation of public records concerning property ownership that is now a hallmark
of the Anglo-American property system, and that has distinguished it from the
English system.242 The innovation of building a comprehensive and public title
registry was a technological solution that not only helped solve colonial legitimacy questions, but facilitated commerce as land became a preeminent colonial
commodity, traded at a scale, intensity, and liquidity theretofore unknown in
England. James Willard Hurst, the father of American legal history, noted that
though many colonies adopted English practices of protecting estates from easy

GOOD SACHEM MASSASOIT OR THE WAMPANOAG TRIBE, AND HIS DESCENDANTS 33-35 (North
Abington, Mass., Zerviah Gould Mitchel ed. 1878).
239. Konig, supra note 235, at 152 (quoting 8 RECORDS AND FILES OF THE QUARTERLY COURTS OF
ESSEX COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS 1680-1683, at 82 (1921)).
240. WILLIAM HENRY WHITMORE, The Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of
Boston, and the Country Adjacent, in 1 THE ANDROS TRACTS: BEING A COLLECTION OF PAMPHLETS AND OFFICIAL PAPERS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE OVERTHROW OF THE
ANDROS GOVERNMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECOND CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS 16 (Boston, T.R. Marvin & Son 1868); see MARY LOU LUSTIG, THE IMPERIAL EXECUTIVE
IN AMERICA: SIR EDMUND ANDROS, 1637-1714, at 152-54 (2002).
241. See, e.g., Narrative: Historical Evidence in Native American Deeds Collection, S. ESSEX DIST. REGISTRY OF DEEDS, https://salemdeeds.com/NAD/focuspoints2.aspx [https://perma.cc/2U8SDKXD] (explaining “second generation deeds”).
242. “[I]n England, . . . no general deed registration system existed.” Konig, supra note 235, at 144
n.22.
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alienation, such as entail and primogeniture,243 “the seventeenth-century beginnings of the recording act system expressed our early interest in turning land
into a more readily transferable good.”244
Likewise, when the newly formed United States looked to western land as its
primary asset from a position of bankruptcy, it recognized the need for a recordkeeping system and a comprehensive rectangular survey, both of which had
grown increasingly common during the colonial period.245 When Congress created a policy for “orderly disposal of the new public domain,” it drew from the
New England system of survey before settlement and models of administration
utilizing a central land office and registers from Virginia.246 The meridians that
formed the basis of outlines for states and townships in Jefferson’s plan took
their cue from colonial charters that followed north-south directions, or parallels
of latitude.247
In short, the fundamental elements of the land system—the comprehensive
title registry, the rectangular survey as a method of creating individual enclosures, as well as the literal outlines of state and local jurisdictions—grew out of
efforts to take possession of Native nations’ homelands. As these activities intertwined expropriation with property creation, we should understand Locke’s capacious descriptions of “improving,” “cultivating,” and “enclosing” land, in his
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THE CLOSE OF THE PROPRIETARY GOVERNMENT BY THE REVOLUTION OF 1719, at 355 (Charleston, McCarter & Co. 1856)). Penn purchased title to large tracts of land before offering land
to settlers; his ﬁrst promotional tract promised lands would be sold free of any “Indian” encumbrance. DONNA BINGHAM MUNGER, PENNSYLVANIA LAND RECORDS: A HISTORY AND
GUIDE FOR RESEARCH 7 (1991).
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See FORD, supra note 202, at 10.
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own account of property creation, as encompassing this labor, which it seems to
describe—measuring and mapping land to prepare it for market, and consolidating this information to facilitate market transactions. Historically, the ﬁnal
innovation that structurally completed this new system of property law and enabled it to commodify land in a qualitatively unprecedented way—though it does
not appear in Locke’s writings—was the introduction of easy foreclosure.
For centuries, English law had regarded land as essentially unlike moveable
goods due to land’s unique characteristics of sustaining life and the challenges
of designating its features, such as rivers, lakes, forests, and shorelines, as anything other than a common good. Under that ancient distinction, chattel property, but not real property, was liable to seizure for the nonpayment of debts.248
However, in the colonies, the protection of large estates from foreclosure made
it possible for debtors to conceal enslaved persons from their creditors on their
land. Further, land and enslaved labor were interdependent commodities: each
asset became useless without the other. The attempt to keep plantations whole
led to experiments in changing the legal categorization of enslaved people: they
were treated alternatively as chattel—the legal equivalent of cattle, sheep, and
horses—and as protected real estate. Indeed, the high value of enslaved people249
led several colonies to use real-property designations to protect this property
from rules governing chattel. South Carolina, following Barbados, tried to characterize slaves as real estate in 1690, though the English Privy Council did not
permit it.250 And Virginia, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Arkansas all designated enslaved persons as realty at different periods between 1705 and 1852. 251 In the
slaveholding south, Professor Thomas Morris tells us, some rules of real-property law were applied to enslaved persons in over a third of jurisdictions.252 Of
these legal experiments, Virginia jurist St. George Tucker stated:
[T]he incidents to real and personal property, respectively, are merely
creatures of the juris positivi, or ordinary rules of law concerning them;
and may be altered and changed to suit the circumstances, convenience,
interest, and advantages of society . . . . Thus in England it might be for
the beneﬁt of commerce to consider a lease for a thousand years, in lands,
248.
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See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *419-20; Claire Priest, Creating an American
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1006, 1007-08 (2016).
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as a mere chattel; and in Virginia it might have been equally for the advantage of agriculture to consider the slave who cultivated the land as
real estate.253
Tucker here underscored the malleability and function of legal categories.
However, treating enslaved people as real estate—protecting them from easy seizure—frustrated planters’ creditors, who lobbied, oppositely, to make lands and
enslaved persons liable for unsecured debts in the colonies. At creditors’ behest,
colonies, beginning in the northeast, thus began to abandon their ancient protections of lands,254 likely encouraged by the growing practice of foreclosing on
Native people’s lands.255
In response to lobbying from the biggest independent slave traders in England, Parliament ﬁnally made lands, as well as enslaved persons, liable for nonpayment of debts across the British colonies with the Debt Recovery Act in
1732.256 The introduction of easy foreclosure across the colonies spurred massive
market growth: land transfers and slave auctions became more frequent, and
access to credit ﬂooded the colonial market, as it became routine to seize both
land and enslaved people like chattel for unpaid debts. The frenetic pace of this
trade became the hallmark of the modern land system—comprised of the comprehensive survey, title registry, homesteading incentives, and easy foreclosure—
that thereby emerged. These new elements redeﬁned the enclosure as a commodity; centralizing and publicizing information concerning that commodity
facilitated its trade; and above all, the mortgage converted that commodity into
an access point for a stream of credit.
To be clear, this system did not exist in England, where the enclosure of common ﬁelds was a relatively new development at the time; and though mortgages
were common, failure to pay debts resulted in an owner’s temporary loss of use
or harvest (usufructual) rights.257 While the idea of boundaries themselves was
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not new,258 enclosures evolved in America to serve the novel idea that “individuals possess all the resources within a given area of land.”259 Never before had
the power to expel people from lands been a key mechanism of the market, without which credit and growth would grind to a halt. This new land system evolved
in response to a conception of “unlimited” land that was there for the taking,
which gave erasure a positive frame. As Hurst observed, “the sheer abundance
of land was probably enough to assure that a static, feudal type of tenure could
not take lasting root with us.”260 Its effectiveness during the colonial period encouraged colonial and state governments, and ﬁnally the United States, bankrupt after the Revolutionary War, to view the sale of “wild lands” as their greatest
source of revenue.261 Unsurprisingly, the production and regulation of the nation’s two most valuable forms of property—land and people—were a major priority, preoccupation, and source of conﬂict for governments—colonial, state, and
federal—in ways that have had a lasting effect on the nation’s legal institutions
as well as its political, social, and economic life.
It is not difficult to see how the labor theory’s narrative justiﬁcations for conquest coalesced to fortify the lodestar ideology that acquisition, in American
property law, has concerned “unowned things,” and the correspondingly popular, durable mythology of America as terra nullius—open, vacant, virgin soil.262
At minimum, teaching about the labor theory should include the well-established scholarship on the context of its development—on the long, consistent
history of its invocation by major ﬁgures in American history to justify colonization, and the way its ﬁctions stereotype and erase Native and African peoples.
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BANNER, supra note 24, at 43-44 (quoting 1 RODGER WILLIAMS, A Key into the Language of
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259. BANNER, supra note 24, at 37.
260. HURST, supra note 244, at 12.
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Here, I have further proposed that the labor theory also presents us with an account of the actual work—including legal work—of property creation in the colonies.
The study of how laws evolved to render land and people the two most signiﬁcant market commodities during this period underscores how innovative the
property systems and practices that emerged in colonial America were and how
long-lasting they have been. The homesteading principle that comes from headright laws, the anti-Blackness constructed by American laws of slavery, the comprehensive rectangular-survey system from which the shape of state and local
jurisdictions as well as private plots of land emerged, the centralized title registry
and title recording system, and easy mortgage foreclosure—all these remain major elements of our property system to this day. The history of their respective
development from this early period of innovation to their present signiﬁcant
roles in property markets today further underscores how essential the systems
that deﬁne and organize property interests are in American property law.
Though they are currently eclipsed in property-law curricula by case law regulating relationships between neighbors, the doctrines in those cases merely affect
and modify interests that would not exist and whose trade would be impossible
without these systems.
The labor theory illustrates how omitting the crucial role of colonization and
enslavement in these developments gives the history of American property ownership and territorial expansion a rosy glow. The traditional narrative about
American property has been one of acquisition and expansion without dispossession and displacement; it has tended to suggest that our present systems produce growth without destruction and wealth without costs.263 Yet the context of
conquest and the heavy reliance on enslavement for labor and wealth accumulation meant that the American property system evolved to process resources primarily for their potential to yield monetary proﬁts and open credit streams, and
elevated those goals above others—including preserving homelands, protecting
health, or creating stability in the various conditions that support life. Prioritizing the creation and protection of the monetary value of property, moreover, required a tremendous amount of racial violence, raising another key question for
law—namely the nature of its relationship to violence—that the next Part explores.

263.

As Professor James Willard Hurst wrote, exemplifying this discourse, “we began to remove
such feudal restrictions on alienation as we had suffered and to build up the intricate body of
law concerning the recording acts and the title problems involved in the ﬁnance of land trading.” HURST, supra note 244, at 13.
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iv. possession by dispossession
The theory of “possession” focuses on a central question of modern law: the
way the law organizes the state’s monopoly on force. The well-known maxim
that “possession is nine-tenths of the law” addresses this relationship by acknowledging that it requires an undesirable degree of force to take possession
away from someone and grant it to someone else. The ancient Roman law of uti
possidetis (“as you possess, you may continue to possess”) also expresses a strong
preference for stability. As the foregoing analysis shows, however, in the American colonies and the United States, taking “possession” of things already in the
possession of others was the consummating condition for claiming title by conquest. The necessity of dispossession to take possession ﬂipped the ancient priority of maintaining the status quo on its head,264 in a context where the project
of conquest and nation building were one—a duality that Professor Aziz Rana
has called “the two faces of American freedom.”265 Present casebooks, by omitting this context, cannot show the essential role that property law played in acting as a kind of glue between these faces, to both extract resources from prior
possessors and reconstitute them as the property of others.
On the one hand, the lack of attention to expropriation as a critical part of
property creation stems from another selective application of theory—recognizing whites’ possession, but neither Native nor Black people’s. Beyond that conceptual inequity, however, it is also important to recognize as a practical matter
that the centuries-long, concerted effort to dispossess others, and thereby, to take
possession of the continent, imparted lasting dynamics to the laws and institutions that developed to facilitate that process. In particular, in the United States,
laws mobilized and sanctioned the use of force to a degree that had not been
known or necessary in other contexts, where the aim of governance was to maintain the status quo.
This Part uses two examples to illustrate how public laws organized the violence of dispossession and taking possession by delegating that work to private
entities: ﬁrst, the example of headrights or land grants discussed in Section IV.A;
and second, the “fugitive slave” controversy and enslaved persons’ ﬂights to freedom. In both instances, the state had no capacity to take direct responsibility for

264.

This inversion of ancient principles is consistent with the laws and institutions described
above in Section III.B, which Hurst observed “made private property pre-eminently a dynamic, not a static institution.” Id. at 10.
265. RANA, supra note 12. Similarly, Richard Hildreth in 1840 called the American Republic as
much an experiment in racial despotism as in democracy. RICHARD HILDRETH, DESPOTISM IN
AMERICA: OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND RESULTS OF THE SLAVEHOLDING SYSTEM IN
THE UNITED STATES 7-34 (Boston, Mass. Anti-Slavery Soc’y & New York, Am. Anti-Slavery
Soc’y 2d ed. 1840).
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the force required to create and maintain land and people as the two principal
genres of property in early America. Instead, it deputized private entities with
promises to back their private claims to ownership and wealth, guiding a diffusion of force that also came to permeate and animate private social life. This innovative approach to governance and nation-building generated lasting norms
about social violence, and a legal tradition that chronically pitted one community’s ancestral homelands against another’s real estate market, and human freedom against a fearfully dehumanizing new right to property.
A. The Homesteading Principle: Conquest by Settlement
From the Founding Era, government officials understood that taking possession of lands required violence,266 and though they explored other modes,
they ultimately outsourced this racial violence to private parties as a policy
choice.267 In confronting the fact that powerful Native nations would not allow
them to seize lands without a show of direct force, the United States drew from
the colonies’ experience in adopting the method of incentivizing settlement with
land grants and subsidies to take possession of western territories.268 The United
States thus used promises of land to recruit white populations, remove Native
nations, and convert lands into property, though it adapted these promises to a
new federal structure.269 Instead of simply granting lands to settlers, however, it
planned to create revenue for the federal government by selling lands, “the new
nation’s arguably most valuable asset,” to settlers—as Professor Gregory Ablavsky notes, “cheap now, they promised to rise inexorably in value as Anglo-Americans migrated west.”270
After the Revolutionary War, the United States was both ﬁfty-four million
dollars in debt and claimed vast territories ceded by Britain under the Treaty of

266.

Alexander Hamilton, for example, noted that “Indian hostilities . . . would always be at hand.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
267. K-Sue Park, Insuring Conquest: U.S. Expansion and the Indian Depredation Claims System, 17961920, 8 HIST. PRESENT 57, 59 (2018). Hurst gave this delegation a positive spin: “[W]e loaned
the organized force of the community to private planners,” HURST, supra note 244, at 11, ensuring “the central place of the modern institution of private property in our politics as well
as in our economic organization;” “the challenge of the unopened continent dominated our
imagination,” id. at 8.
268. Park, supra note 267, at 81.
269. Id. at 65.
270. GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND: GOVERNING PROPERTY AND VIOLENCE IN THE FIRST
U.S. TERRITORIES 14 (2021).
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Paris.271 Though early statesmen anticipated that “a rich and fertile country, of
an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, will soon become a
national stock”272—it exerted no actual control over the region, which was ruled
by powerful Native nations. When the Continental Congress in 1783 considered
how to generate revenue from the lands and pay soldiers, it admitted that “the
public ﬁnances do not admit of any considerable expenditure to extinguish Indian claims upon such lands.”273 Secretary of War Henry Knox, echoing a view
expressed by George Washington, recommended that the nation adopt the welltested method of conquest by settlement, rather than a military campaign. Referring to the colonial experience, he advised that “it is most probable that the
Indians will, by the invariable operation of the causes which have hitherto existed in their intercourse with the whites, be reduced to a very small number.”274
To produce revenue, the federal government claimed the exclusive prerogative to acquire lands from Native nations—introducing the structure of trade that
Johnson v. M’Intosh would affirm—to become the middle point for transfer of
lands between its extraction and distribution to private entities. In order to manage this role, it also established a bureaucracy to oversee the federal land system,
including, eventually, a U.S. Surveyor General’s Office and Land Offices to manage both the creation of enclosures and settlers’ claims. In theory, the federal
prerogative required prospective private purchasers to wait for a survey to purchase land. But in practice, settlers did not observe this formality and entered
tribal lands prior to federal acquisition. As Professor Andro Linklater writes,
“[t]he race that developed between the surveyors and squatters marked the entire history of the land survey, and it was rare for a surveying team to measure

271.

See, e.g., Reginald Horsman, The Indian Policy of an “Empire for Liberty,” in NATIVE AMERICANS
AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 37, 38 (Frederick E. Hoxie, Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds.,
1999); DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED GENTLEMEN AND WHITE SAVAGES: INDIANS, FEDERALISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 88 (2008); see also Park, supra
note 267, at 267 (describing the ﬁnancial circumstances of the United States and its relationships to Native nations following the Revolutionary War).
272. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 238 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
273. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 682 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922);
see also HIBBARD, supra note 261, at 32-33 (discussing the public-land system’s genesis and
traits); Park, supra note 267, at 65 (providing additional context around the same quote).
274. Henry Knox, Report from H. Knox, Secretary of War, to the President of the United States, Relative
to the Northwestern Indians, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 13-14 (William S.
Hein & Co. 1998), as reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 13 (Francis
Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000).
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productive country that had no settlers at all.”275 This triangulated legal relationship produced a tense dynamic of push and pull between the government and
settlers that drove dispossession through the nineteenth century.
Both the federal government and settlers heavily criticized the other’s responsibility for the consequent violence, seeking to maximize their own advantages. Still, they largely acquiesced to each other for the mutual beneﬁts they
accrued. Settlers, for example, understood the United States’ dependence on
them for a frontline role in territorial expansion, and “that initiating conﬂict with
the Indians was the surest way to prod the federal government to buy the Indians’ land,” with the rationale of preventing war.276 Their aggressive spread into
Indian Country to pressure the federal government into purchasing the lands277
provoked Secretary of State Timothy Pickering to point out that this logic of
expansion was limitless, and ask, “[W]here shall we stop?”278 A federal emissary
complained that in Georgia, settlers’ rallying cry had become “let us kill the Indians, bring on a war, and we shall get land.”279 While settlers knew these incursions into Native nations’ lands were “extra-legal,”280 they savvily argued that
they acted in accordance with the federal government’s wishes—as “resident militia” “serv[ing] in the ﬁeld without compensation and at their own expense”281—and criticizing the federal government for failing to provide them
with protection. The squatters of the Pike River Claimants Union in 1836, for
example, stressed their labor and sacriﬁces, and explained in their constitution
that “as the Government has heretofore encouraged emigration by granting preemption to actual settlers, we are assured that our settling and cultivating the
public lands is in accordance with the best wishes of Government.”282
For the government’s part, many government officials described the consequent violence in the borderlands as the result of troublesome “banditti” and

275.

LINKLATER, supra note 261, at 163.
BANNER, supra note 24, at 126.
277. Id. at 124-25.
278. Id. at 125.
279. LETTERS OF BENJAMIN HAWKINS, 1796-1806, at 102 (Savannah, Ga. Hist. Soc’y 1916).
280. HIBBARD, supra note 261, at 198.
281. Park, supra note 267, at 68. In 1897, for example, the state of Utah sent a memorial to Congress
describing their settlers as such. Id. (citing Memorial from the Governor and Legislative Assembly of Utah, Records of the U.S. Senate, Record Group 46 (RG 46), 55A-J15; National
Archives Building, Washington, D.C.).
282. HURST, supra note 244, at 4 (quoting Constitution of the Pike River Claimants Union, reprinted in 2 WISC. ASSEMBLY J. 472-75 (1856)).
276.
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“rabble” on both sides.283 But while in some difficult diplomatic situations, the
government punished settlers for their incursions, in other instances, they
turned a blind eye and conﬁrmed settlers’ claims. Under this arrangement, after
all, the government preserved federal dollars by not paying a formal military
force to take the lands. The apparent independence of settlers’ violence also left
the government free to maintain a position of formal diplomacy towards
tribes284 and pursue an overt policy of conciliation for most of the nineteenth
century.285 In other words, the government’s use of private incentives to motivate settlers created enough distance that the government could disavow, tacitly
endorse, or openly praise the racial violence of conquest. At the same time, as
Ablavsky has recently shown, the government did not have the ability to do
much more than manage the settlers’ prodding and pushing, in ways that created
new law, expanded jurisdictions, and cemented a relationship between a nation
and its polity marked by distrust and mutual exploitation.286
Though for decades the federal government refused responsibility for settlers’ invasions into Native nations’ lands, at the end of the nineteenth century,
with the perspective that it had largely achieved conquest, it began to explicitly
celebrate settlers’ actions in ways that have entered the national mythology.287 In
1886, for example, the House Committee on Indian Affairs declared that “[t]he
early pioneers in the far West, the makers of a new civilization, the founders of
a great empire, the leaders in the great army of workers who have made the vast
western wilderness blossom with rich harvests, are among the noblest heroes
and greatest benefactors of this Republic.”288 Today, the legacy of the long tension over who bore responsibility for the racial violence that fueled conquest includes not only this delayed romantic gloss, but also a public accustomed to social space permeated by private racial violence, steeped in all the prejudices and
affects of interpersonal relationships. Further, this strategy of conquest cultivated an aggrieved population of settlers who raged against a government they
deeply mistrusted—but also found their identity through their alignment with
it and its racial war, and vented their rage upon those in possession of the lands
in which they believed their future worth lay.

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Gerard Clarﬁeld, Protecting the Frontiers: Defense Policy and the Tariff Question in the First Washington Administration, 32 WM. & MARY Q. 443, 449-50 (1975).
Park, supra note 267, at 67-68.
Id.
ABLAVSKY, supra note 270, at 2-3.
See Park, supra note 267, at 57.
Id. at 78 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 49-3117, at 10 (1886)).
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B. Property Against Human Self-Possession
The great contradiction of the American chattel-slave trade was the fact that
a person remained a person, but was treated by law as property. This “problem”
of law generated an entire legal infrastructure that sharply focuses questions
about possession and the relationship between the law and force. In an ongoing
effort to elevate the property value above the human value of an enslaved person,
legislatures passed a plethora of laws sanctioning slaveholders’ and other whites’
physical and sexual violence against enslaved people: slaveholders had, for example, “the unlimited right to abuse their slaves to any extreme of brutality and
wantonness as long as the slave survived,”289 and third parties had battery rights
with limitations.290 Colonial laws generally held that killings of enslaved people
were not punishable as murder,291 while U.S. states recognized homicide unless
the killings occurred in the commission of the highly malleable exception called
a “moderate correction.”292 Indeed, in State v. Mann, Judge Ruffin called “full
dominion of the owner over the slave . . . essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of the master, and the public tranquility, greatly dependent
upon their subordination.”293
The controversy over enslaved people’s ﬂight from captivity, the focus of this
Section, illustrates the way Anglo-American laws sanctioned and directed enormous violence required by the effort to control people as property. Claims of
possession constituted the central issue of fugitivity: people’s self-reclamation
subverted slaveholders’ possession or “uncontrolled authority over the body.”294

289.

Andrew Fede, Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619-1865: A Case Study of
Law and Social Change in Six Southern States, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 93, 132 (1985); see MORRIS,
supra note 250, at 163-71.
290. MORRIS, supra note 250, at 196-97.
291. E.g., An Act About the Casuall Killing of Slaves (Sept. 17, 1668 - Oct. 20, 1669), reprinted in 2
WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS
OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 270 (New
York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823); see also MORRIS, supra note 250, at 163-65 (discussing homicide laws in the colonies).
292. MORRIS, supra note 250, at 172 (quoting GA. CONST. of 1798 art. III, § 12, in 2 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOR OR HERETOFORE FORMING UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 801
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1906)).
293. State v. Mann, 16 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 268 (1829). For commentary, see EUGENE D. GENOVESE,
ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 35-36 (First Vintage Books 1976) (1974);
and MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND
LITERATURE 20-65 (2003).
294. 16 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266.
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In other words, slavery pitted people’s self-possession against enslavers’ possession of them, so that one person’s liberty confronted another’s property right.
As Professor Peter H. Wood has written, “[n]o single act of self-assertion was
more signiﬁcant among slaves or more disconcerting among whites than that of
running away . . . . [T]hese were the people who, in a real sense, elected to ‘steal
themselves.’”295 As this Section shows, the effort to defy the persistent truth of
personhood manifested in a battery of laws that acknowledged the limited ability
of the state to enforce enslavers’ possession by delegating that labor of racial violence to private entities—slave catchers, private militias, and the “pursuing
committees” of protective associations.
Since a person inexorably remained in possession of herself, even in the face
of overwhelming uses of force, people’s determination to escape bondage profoundly destabilized the institution of slavery from its beginning.296 There was
no period during the slave trade when slaveholders did not attempt to mobilize
state force against fugitivity to protect their rights to property in people. As
C.W.A. David wrote in 1924, “[a]lmost immediately after the introduction of
slavery we ﬁnd that its horrors led to so many runaways that colonial laws relating to fugitive slaves had to be enacted;”297 and various laws commanded private
persons to capture any enslaved person they found traveling without a pass.298
This common-law heritage likely facilitated the adoption of the Fugitive Slave
Clause in the Constitution without event.299 However, by the time of the Constitutional Convention, the states had divided on the issue, 300 with Vermont,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire all having abolished slavery

295.

PETER H. WOOD, BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670
THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION 239 (1974).
296. Professor Eugene Genovese observes that people’s escapes “struck the hardest blow against
the regime.” GENOVESE, supra note 293, at 648.
297. C.W.A. David, The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and Its Antecedents, 9 J. NEGRO HIST. 18, 18
(1924).
298. See id. at 18-19; see also MARION GLEASON MCDOUGALL, FUGITIVE SLAVES (1619-1865), at 2, 89
(Books for Librs. Press 1971) (1891) (discussing and giving examples of colonial laws that
addressed fugitive slaves); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story,
Slavery, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1086, 1116 (1993) (detailing attempted
legal resistance to the forced return of fugitive slaves).
299. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, The Federal Right to Recover Fugitive Slaves: An Absolute but Self-Defeating
Property Right, 2 SAVANNAH L. REV. 21, 22 (2015).
300. See James Madison, Saturday June 30, 1787. in Convention, in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 486 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“[T]he States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but . . . principally from [the effects of] their having or not having slaves.”).
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between 1777 and 1784.301 The stakes of the trade had also grown to over £21
million by 1774,302 the equivalent of almost $3.2 billion today. During the Revolutionary Era, as the number of people who escaped and sued their enslavers for
freedom increased dramatically, formerly enslaved people in New England organized antislavery committees and disseminated Black freedom petitions with the
help of white abolitionists.303
In response to a controversy arising from the abduction of John Davis from
Pennsylvania back to enslavement in Virginia, Congress passed the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793, which authorized a slaveholder or “his agent or attorney” to
“seize the fugitive” and seek a certiﬁcate for removal from a judge or magistrate.304 Because the 1793 Act provided no penalties for false claims, it was easy
for slave catchers to procure removal certiﬁcates for both free and escaped Black
people. As Professor Barbara Holden-Smith observes, the Act “proved to be an
inadequate solution to the conﬂict over the return of fugitive slaves, and it did
nothing to deal with the problem of the kidnapping of free blacks.”305 Kidnappings in the North subsequently increased, perhaps also fueled by new pressures
from the prohibition on the transatlantic slave trade in 1807 and the establishment of new cotton plantations in the Old Southwest, or the land that eventually
became Missouri, Mississippi, Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas, as well
as parts of Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky and western Florida.306 The free states
became “one vast hunting ground,”307 as slave catchers roamed them “to reclaim
runaway slaves but also to kidnap free blacks to sell into bondage in the
South.”308
Many free state governments responded by passing “Personal Liberty Laws”
to supplement the Act with both protections for Black people against kidnapping

301.

David, supra note 297, at 20.

302. JONES, supra note 10, at 90.
303.

MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 67 (2016).
Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793); see Paul Finkelman, The Kidnapping of John Davis
and the Adoption of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, 56 J.S. HIST. 397, 397 (1990); THOMAS D.
MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 1780-1861, at 19-22
(1974) (describing the contents and adoption of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
305. Holden-Smith, supra note 298, at 1118 (footnote omitted).
306. Id. at 1119-20; see also GARY B. NASH & JEAN R. SODERLUND, FREEDOM BY DEGREES: EMANCIPATION IN PENNSYLVANIA AND ITS AFTERMATH 197 (1991) (identifying these same factors).
307. Holden-Smith, supra note 298, at 1087 (quoting David, supra note 297, at 22).
308. Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 304, at 33-34 (describing anti-slavery activists’ criticisms of the
Fugitive Slave Law on these grounds).
304.
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and state assistance for private slave catchers who complied with the state’s procedures.309 Pennsylvania, a free state bordered by three slave states, tried repeatedly to address kidnapping.310 In 1826, it required Southern claimants to apply
to a judge, justice of the peace, or alderman for an arrest warrant, and to produce
evidence other than their own affidavits to verify claims; several other Northern
states followed with more and less protective provisions.311 In the circumstances
that led to Prigg v. Pennsylvania,312 Margaret Morgan—who had lived with her
parents in practical, if not formal, freedom for her entire life—eventually married
a free man from Pennsylvania, where she then moved with him and their children and had at least one more child.313 After her formal slaveholder died, his
niece and heiress hired “four prominent Maryland citizens,” including Edward
Prigg, to seize Mrs. Morgan.314 Since the justice of the peace from whom they
sought a certiﬁcate of removal “declined further cognizance of the case,” they
forcibly took her and her children back to Maryland and into slavery, in violation
of Pennsylvania law.315 When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, in a robust assertion of national power, Justice Story found Pennsylvania’s law
preempted by the 1793 Act. 316 Further, he extolled property rights as sacred
above all other rights, and referred to the “possession” or “repossession” of a
person such as Mrs. Morgan as property nine times in his discussion of the interests at stake.317 Story never mentioned the problem of kidnapping, in an example of how legal actors, in Holden-Smith’s words, “subordinated the claims
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311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

317.

Joseph Nogee, The Prigg Case and Fugitive Slavery, 1842-1850, 39 J. NEGRO HIST. 185, 197-99
(1954); MORRIS, supra note 304, at 28-29. Some prohibited the use of state jails, and state
officials from assisting in the capture of alleged fugitives, or mandated jury trials or an appellate procedure. See generally MORRIS, supra note 304, at 23-41 (surveying state and federal responses to “kidnapping and fugitives”).
Nogee, supra note 309, at 191.
Schmitt, supra note 299, at 24.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
Holden-Smith, supra note 298, at 1122-23.
Id. at 1122.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 617-18; see Nogee, supra note 309, at 185; see also Holden-Smith, supra note
298, at 1122-23 (providing more background on the Prigg case).
See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph
Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 294; see also Holden-Smith, supra note
298, at 1134-38 (detailing Justice Story’s “nationalistic vision”).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 612-24.
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of black people to human dignity to the claims of slaveholders to their property.”318
The Court’s decision in Prigg, however, also structurally changed the law of
capture. By giving the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over the fugitive-slave problem, Professor Gautham Rao observes, it “absolved the states of
any enforcement burden[s]” and “forced slaveholders to drastically reframe their
approach to the problem of fugitive slaves.”319 The Justices acknowledged that
the federal government had no capacity to marshal the force required for this
scale of “property protection” or dispossession. Indeed, the remoteness of the
federal government and its lack of manpower, Chief Justice Taney decried,
would render the 1793 law “ineffectual and delusive” without help from the
states.320 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which Congress eventually devised to
resolve this problem, also looked to the tradition of private informal militias and
the tradition of the posse comitatus,321 instating a federal posse comitatus law in its
command to “all good citizens . . . to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient
execution of this law.”322 Section nine focused on the force required to dispossess
the fugitive, acknowledging “reason to apprehend that such fugitive will be rescued by force from his or their possession.”323 It not only authorized but required
the officer overseeing the capture to “employ so many persons as he may deem
necessary . . . to overcome such force,” and provided for payment from the U.S.
Treasury.324 At least one source estimates that slaveowners succeeded in about
eighty percent of their attempts to repossess persons under the new Act.325 Still,
before and after the Act of 1850, slaveholders built their own private enforcement
power through local protective associations that organized “pursuing committee[s],” recapture-and-reward funds, and “a force of agents” to ﬁnd fugitives
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320.
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322.
323.
324.
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Holden-Smith, supra note 298, at 1146. See generally id. at 1138-46 (discussing “the sanctity of
property rights”). Joe Lockard describes this balancing act as Justice Story’s “fusing of sacriﬁcial nationalism with a racial denial of citizenship and self-determining subjectivity.” Joe
Lockard, Justice Story’s Prigg Decision and the Defeat of Freedom, 52 AM. STUD. 467, 469 (2007).
Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in
Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 22 (2008).
Id. (quoting Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 631 (Taney, C.J., concurring)).
For a comprehensive account, see generally Rao, supra note 319, tracing the history of the posse
comitatus doctrine.
Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, § 5, 9 Stat. 462, 462-63.
Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
Id.
Rao, supra note 319, at 26 (citing STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 132 (1970)).
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who crossed state lines and supplement local police forces.326 These types of unions spurred tremendous violence between neighbors and prompted raids,
shootouts, and kidnappings, especially in state borderlands.327
The extensive private organizing mobilized to counter this violence is well
known as the Underground Railroad, a network of interracial abolitionist organizing sites in parts of Ohio, south-central Pennsylvania and Philadelphia, upstate
New York and New York City, the area around the District of Columbia, the port
cities of New Bedford and Boston, Detroit, western Illinois, Black settlements in
Canada, and free Black communities in border slave states and the northwest.328
Like well-known luminaries such as Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglass, and
Sojourner Truth, many who “self-emancipated” by ﬂight eventually led the abolition movement through their advocacy and writings, and by “[r]unning off
slaves.” 329 The number of people who escaped enslavement is uncertain, but
Professor Manisha Sinha’s history of the abolition movement estimates that
150,000 people escaped slavery between 1830 and 1860.330 For a sense of proportion, between 1790 and abolition, the population of enslaved people grew by
about 580%, from about 700,000 to almost 4 million people.331 The abolitionist
movement organized powerfully throughout this period, nationwide and also
internationally, not only to end enslavement but for citizenship, enfranchisement, and equality.332 Against this backdrop, the local paper the Missouri Republican ran ads showing an annual average of forty people escaping their enslavers
between 1851 and 1860; similar ads in Richmond newspapers during that time
indicated an annual average of seventy escapes.333
Abolitionists, highly conscious of slaveholders’ invocation of property rights,
resolved to refuse it in absolute terms, to the point of criticizing Douglass’s pur-

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

332.

333.

R.J.M. Blackett, Dispossessing Massa: Fugitive Slaves and the Politics of Slavery After 1850, 10 AM.
NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 119, 128 (2009).
Id. at 128-31.
SINHA, supra note 303, at 400.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 382.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, BICENTENNIAL EDITION: HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 14 ser. A-91-104, n.1 (1975), https://www2.census.gov
/library/publications/1975/compendia/hist_stats_colonial-1970/hist_stats_colonial-1970p1chA.pdf [https://perma.cc/D39R-576N].
The movement used the slogan, “We are Americans.” SINHA, supra note 303, at 324; see id. at
316-30 (describing abolitionist organizing for Black citizenship); id. at 339-80 (describing international abolitionist organizing).
Blackett, supra note 326, at 121.
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chase of his own freedom with British funds. William Lloyd Garrison, who insisted that enslaved people’s efforts to purchase liberation could not be called
“compensation” to slaveholders, called the money a “ransom.”334 Meanwhile, in
the literature they produced, self-emancipated people frequently referenced and
repurposed familiar theories to emphasize their own personhood through invoking their property rights and self-possession. Henry Bibb, for example, who escaped slavery in 1841 and published his narrative in 1849, invoked the labor theory when he asked, “[W]ho had a better right to eat the fruits of my own hard
earnings than myself?”335 William Wells Brown, who escaped in 1834 and published his story in 1847, pointed to his own dispossession when he called his master “the man who stole me as soon as I was born.”336 In his narrative of selfemancipation, James W.C. Pennington—who escaped slavery at the age of nineteen in 1827, became the ﬁrst African American to attend classes at Yale, and published the ﬁrst history of Black people in the United States337—resoundingly denounced “the chattel principle,” which reduced human beings to marketable
commodities, as the essence of slavery.338
All this evidence of self-possession was galling to slaveholders, whose right
of possession it directly challenged. They spun narratives in response that “refused to acknowledge among runaways signs of rationality, emotion, and independence, which they hoped to both ignore and suppress.”339 They also blamed
white “negro stealers,” “unnamed white men,” and “thieving Abolitionists” for
their losses,340 claiming that white abolitionists were leading and inspiring fugitives, rather than the reverse,341 and that Douglass could not possibly have been
enslaved.342 An 1851 cartoon by the Philadelphia lawyer and artist Edward Williams Clay, who specialized in proslavery political illustrations, is typically demeaning and exempliﬁes how discourse centered the issue of possession.343 Its
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
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ﬁrst panel depicts a slaveholder and federal marshal invoking U.S. law to confront a white abolitionist, with a fugitive enslaved person cowering behind him,
while the second panel shows the same abolitionist pointing to stolen cloth in
the shop of the slaveholder, who responds with regard to the cloth: “They are
fugitives from you, are they? . . . I have a higher law of my own, and possession
is nine points in the law.”344 The enslaved person agrees: “Of course Massa. De
dam Bobolitionist is de wus enemy we poor n[***]s have got.”345
These cultural narratives frequently found expression in the law, particularly
when white abolitionists were charged with dispossessing slavers. In 1854, for
example, Kentucky governor Lazarus Powell demanded the return of enslaved
persons from Indiana governor Joseph Wright, and charged white abolitionist
Delia Webster “with conducing and (enticing) away slaves from the possession
& services of there [sic] masters and (overseers).”346 Even when enslaved people
“quite literally and obviously took their lives in their own hands,” as Wood
writes, they were “misrepresented as passive objects, ‘forced,’ ‘urged,’ ‘allowed,’
or ‘provoked’ to escape by various whites.”347 In other words, there was a strong
investment in narratives about property that denied Black people’s personhood
through a refusal to recognize their inherent self-possession and capacity for
property rights. Today, as we mine these histories to consider how they have
shaped property law and our world, we must learn, too, to read the layers of
erasure within them. Beneath the general erasure of histories of racial violence
and dispossession, we must seek the stories of how people resisted enslavement
and conquest, to understand better how they shaped the laws against and
through which they fought for their lives.
The question of the relationship between law and force, which lies at the
heart of the theory of possession in property law, presents another system-wide
property issue that received a dramatic new conﬁguration in the American colonies, with consequences for the way we understand the relationship between
public and private actors in the United States. Where the traditional theory of
possession seeks to minimize the use of force with a rule that honors the status
quo of possession, in the colonies and the United States, property markets only
emerged from upturning the status quo of possession. The two most signiﬁcant
forms of property could only be created and maintained by using a breathtaking
amount of force—that is, through the dispossession and subjugation of Native
344.

Id.
Id.
346. Letter from Lazarus W. Powell, Gov. of Ky., to Joseph A. Wright, Gov. of Ind. (June 26, 1854),
https://www.in.gov/history/for-educators/all-resources-for-educators/resources/underground-railroad/gwen-crenshaw/indiana-and-fugitive-slave-laws/ [https://perma.cc/75N2G5SE].
347. WOOD, supra note 295, at 248.
345.
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and African-descended peoples. Consequently, a primary question, in a context
launched by discovery, was how to use laws to marshal the force required to produce and protect this new world of property, rather than to preserve the peace.
In both the examples of headright or homesteading laws and fugitive slave
laws, the state deputized private individuals to enact this violence and incentivized them to do so with the promise to recognize the signiﬁcant ownership
claims they could thereby make. Moreover, it was through this private action
that the state expanded its own jurisdiction and increased collective wealth. The
conceptual and practical consequences of this arrangement help explain the paramount importance of property in America, and, in particular, its centrality to
the relationship between the state and society and social relations more generally.
Among other lessons one might draw from this history, the key role of homesteading in territorial expansion demonstrates that in the United States, private
property preceded public jurisdiction, reversing European conceptions of a state
that distributes private interests. Additionally, using legal devices such as homesteading incentives and fugitive slave laws to invest private parties personally in
creating and protecting private property moved the racial violence required for
this project into the domain of the private sphere, mobilizing populations
against one another as they pursued their property interests and sought to defend themselves—pitting property interests against peace.
v. expropriation and the creation of american property
law
Discovery, labor, and possession are all topics that ubiquitously begin property-law courses and fall under the broader topic of initial “acquisition” of property. Property-law teachers typically present acquisition as an abstract, theoretical question about how property interests arise in the ﬁrst place, or how
unowned things come to be owned.348 Accordingly, discovery, labor, and possession are presented as principles dictating, respectively, that entitlements belong
to the party in a dispute whose claim is “ﬁrst-in-time,” who invests labor to produce the property, or who is already in possession in order to preserve the status
quo. Preliminarily, if we begin by acknowledging that the lands belonged to sovereign Native nations, and the African people brought here were deprived of

348.
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their inherent bodily autonomy by force, we acknowledge that historically, “acquisition” did not centrally concern “unowned things.”349 Rather, in the English
colonies, establishing property claims constituted a process of collective expropriation, which exacted immeasurable costs from Indigenous and Black communities. Further, the practices, strategies, and theories that colonists used to render
these resources property—including the three doctrinal principles discussed
above—have become hallmarks of the property laws and institutions that they
engendered.
Yet as a result of these erasures and the path-dependent development described in Part I, the American property-law curriculum today focuses almost
exclusively on English doctrines regulating relations between neighbors—rather
than the remarkable innovations that distinguish the American property system
from others and made it a model that is now propagated around the world. In
particular, the curriculum, as it has evolved, fails to focus on the unique fruits of
the colonial experiment that would otherwise help us understand the contemporary national landscape of property: the American land system that underpins
the real estate market and its structural reliance on racial violence to produce
value. It is under a framework of erasure that the topic of “acquisition” comes to
concern hypotheticals between neighbors or a conceptual origin story, not American history. With respect to the curriculum more broadly, recent attempts to
teach about race in property-law courses have tended to involve the addition of
Federal Indian law or civil-rights topics to an otherwise set property-law
canon—not a fundamental rethinking of the core curriculum. This marginalization of race reﬂects a broader tendency in the legal academy to relegate the study
of race to an optional elective rather than a central subject and a necessary element of the study of law.350 The absence of an account of the formative role of
race in American property law, or any other ﬁeld, reinforces the mistaken idea
that racial dynamics are aberrational manifestations of individual prejudice infecting an essentially neutral system of law.
The Parts above show that the history of the relationship between Native
nations and the colonies (later the United States) is the history of property in
land in America. This history, moreover, is highly entangled with the history of

349.

Benton & Straumann, supra note 127, at 14. Benton and Straumann painstakingly show that
early theorists of empire invoked the principle of “res nullius,” from which the idea of “terra
nullius” was derived, to criticize it more often than not. Id. at 1-2.
350. Even this elective status was the hard-won result of advocacy within the legal academy and
groundbreaking scholarship that offered powerful arguments for studying the formative role
of race in law. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in
Legal Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 6-7 (1988); Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models,
6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 93, 95 & nn.6 & 7 (1990). This Article builds on the efforts and
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enslavement, which sprang from the same, longer legal tradition that authorized
European conquests, furnished labor for the expropriation of lands, and also
uniquely developed the racism that fueled it. Further, the anti-Blackness it entrenched not only inﬂuenced the racialization of other nonwhite groups in America, but (in a story for another time) also powerfully reorganized the land system
to circumvent Black property rights after the abolition of slavery. These histories
are therefore critical for understanding property in land in the United States,
which is still the central subject of property-law classes today. Professor William
Wood has written that “[l]and, and controlling what happens on it and the revenues from it, has always been the focal point of relations between Indigenous
peoples and non-Natives in North America.” 351 This control remains a focal
point of maintaining power and wealth for the United States, which grew the
market it built from the lands it expropriated into a real estate market worth
approximately $64 trillion today.352 This real estate market is still a terrain of
racial struggle that continues to enact harms on particular groups. The histories
of conquest and slavery out of which it grew also shaped the systems and practices that today govern the population as a whole.353 These are institutions and
areas of law viewed as mainstream and fundamental, which constitute the heart
of legal education and practice now.
These histories, in other words, shaped property law in ways that affect us
all. While this analysis has focused on the ways this history directed material
resources and affected people’s lives, it has also emphasized how closely intertwined the material projects of conquest and enslavement have long been with
the enterprise of producing historical narratives about property. The powerful
and persistent pathways of narratives about discovery, labor, and possession
show that the ideological denial or justiﬁcation of racial violence is bound up
with material practices of creating property and property value through racial

351.

Wood, supra note 158, at 415.
Fin. Accts. Guide, B.1: Derivation of U.S. Net Wealth, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV.
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violence. This Article has foregrounded the erasures that persist in the way we
conceptualize and talk about property because they are part of the legacy of this
ongoing violence.
The analysis above offers an example of how we might take account of the
histories of conquest and slavery in our understanding of property law, and how
doing so alters our understanding of the principles for which various topics
stand. In particular, it shows that beyond incorporating new historical information into our study, undoing the erasure of conquest and slavery from the
canon requires rethinking the theoretical conclusions we draw from historical
information about the dynamics and impact of existing institutions and practices. Parts II, III, and IV show, for example, that discovery, labor, and possession
are not merely abstract alternative principles—they were also intimately related
to each other historically. Discovery, indeed, served as an umbrella mandate for
labor and possession, creating the imperative to create new markets through
conquest and enslavement. As we have seen, possession constituted a critical requirement or condition for making a “discovery” claim. If possession, then,
served as the measure of a property claim by conquest, the labor theory references the particular work that colonists performed under this mandate to take
possession of—or to actually occupy and control—property. Further, considering
the theories in their historical context appears to reverse the abstract principles
they are now thought to represent: we see that the Discovery Doctrine nulliﬁed
rather than upheld ﬁrst-in-time rights, as it imposed a racial order on the world;
the labor theory denied the labor of non-Europeans, who comprised the key labor force in the colonies; and establishing possession of property in America required legal, systematic coordination to make dispossession possible on a massive scale.
Though this Article takes up only three examples of property-law topics,
each also illuminates dynamics that operate across speciﬁc doctrines to affect the
property system, and by extension, the legal system, as a whole. Part II discusses
the history of “discovery,” or the international laws of conquest that Chief Justice
Marshall explicitly described and drew upon in Johnson v. M’Intosh, which currently has virtually no place in property-law casebooks and curricula. However,
this legal context, which authorized early modern European conquests and the
transatlantic slave trade, explains how the original American colonies were established and grew. Without it, property-law courses fail to explain that U.S.
sovereign jurisdiction and the authority to decide law—not just property law,
but all law—stems from “discovery,” or conquest.
“Discovery,” most fundamentally, was a European racial project aimed at the
creation of commercial value. Consequently, a broad racial hierarchy of humanity set the stage for English colonists’ activities in mainland America, where “discovery” licensed the use of force on non-Christian non-Europeans. “Discovery”
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therefore made race itself a dynamic resource that colonists channeled through
the development of new legal institutions and practices. The arena of these activities was trade: the drive to produce property, and increase its monetary value,
propelled the interdependent processes of conquest and enslavement for centuries. The longer tradition of legal justiﬁcations for conquest itself illustrates how
universal legal formulations can further hierarchy when that hierarchy comprises
a background rule of trade. Chief Justice Marshall himself, however, explicitly
affirmed racial hierarchy as the basis of both U.S. jurisdiction and its authority
to decide the rules for how other sovereigns—namely, Native nations and
states—could trade interests in land as the United States continued to cultivate
novel markets to pay its debts and grow.
Section III.A examined perhaps the most signiﬁcant elaboration of the labor
theory and the logic of entitlement by virtue of investment, desert, and prevention of waste, in American history: colonists’ invocation of the labor theory to
justify their occupation of Native nations’ lands, which is virtually absent from
property-law casebooks and curricula. Due to the extensive literature on Locke’s
involvement in the histories of conquest and enslavement, property-law professors who do link the study of Locke with colonization may already underscore
the factual inaccuracy of colonists’ description of the labor and land tenure of
Europeans alone as valuable. As they expose colonial accounts of Native people
and practices, it is important to also highlight the lasting ideological and material
consequences of the labor theory. The strong association between property values and race, which both perceives nonwhite communities as destructive or
wasteful to property and drives the actual assessment of higher property values
to property occupied by whites,354 persists across the contemporary real estate
market. The theory’s account of the labor that settlers were required to perform
under headright and homestead laws also indexes a principle that remains enshrined in the U.S. property system as a concept and in actual programs in the
present.
The system within which settlers long claimed ownership following homesteading incentives is permeated with values that are deeply informed by its history. In the unique context of the American colonies, this property system attributed monetary value to land and people, but only once those lands and
people came into European possession or actual control. This approach to property value, which colonists pursued for centuries, not only relied on a high degree
354.
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of racial violence, but elevated the monetary value of land above its other intrinsic environmental or human values. This construction of value remains prevalent
in U.S. law today in many ways; among others, as Professor Rebecca Tsosie has
underscored, U.S. conceptions of sovereignty, property, and wealth, are expressed in laws privileging monetary wealth and the interests of non-Indian
landowners.355 Qualitatively, the conception of wealth that privileges monetary
value above all radically contrasts the multivalent understanding of “wealth”
shared by diverse Native nations, which includes the cultural knowledge and collective identity, both spiritual and political, that comes from land.356 As Professors Kristen Carpenter and Angela Riley have pointed out, the “classic view of
property law [that] focuses on . . . protecting the individual owner’s rights of
exclusion and alienation primarily for wealth maximization purposes” opposes,
more broadly, “a more relational vision . . . [that] honors the legitimate interests
of both owners and nonowners, in furtherance of various human and social values . . . including nonmarket values.”357 Indeed, despite the present dominance
of the American colonial legal paradigm of property that I have described here,
people everywhere continue to experience belonging today through conceptions
of the land as a site of collective memory and nonfungible value.
With respect to the mechanical aspects of the property system, the colonial
innovations that developed this distinctly narrow conception of land value and
dehumanized enslaved people in many respects continue to organize property
interests in America and beyond. The ground-level legal institutions that
emerged during this period to facilitate the trade of those two all-important
commodities ensure property ownership and exchange to this day. As Section
III.B argues, the legal work of property creation includes the creation of the systems and practices that remain key features of the land system and anchor the
real estate market—the comprehensive survey system, centralized title registry,
and easy foreclosure. The survey system—a national institution in the United
States—became a way to imagine land enclosures in a uniform way across a populace and facilitated constructing them at scale. Validating ownership through
chains of title and recording information concerning commodiﬁed land and
ownership in comprehensive title registries became important ways of increasing
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See Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reﬂections on Native Sovereignty and Property in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291, 1300-06 (2001) (arguing for an intercultural framework
for understanding property).
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the certainty of ownership. They also helped reduce intracolonial disputes, directing more energy toward the collective goal of expropriation and wealth accumulation. Finally, easy foreclosure of lands added fuel to this machine by inducing creditors to feed money into the enterprise of expropriation. When
foreclosure became a normal market practice across the colonial population, rather than a racially-targeted practice, it marked the normalization of harm to individuals previously unthinkable—all for the proﬁts promised by credit or the
debt-based growth of the economy as a whole.
This Article’s ﬁnal example directly addresses the stunning amount of racial
violence that was required to establish possession of lands and people in the colonies and United States in order to consummate novel property claims. This
overarching reality of American history requires that property-law professors
acknowledge that property creation here entailed dispossession, and the contradiction between how “possession” operated under “discovery” and the age-old
principle of possession as a justiﬁcation for property rights. Part IV showed that
the United States organized its monopoly over force by delegating this violence
to the private sphere, not only by adopting the strategy of conquest by settlement, but also in its doomed efforts to resolve a fundamental conundrum of the
chattel slave trade—people’s fundamental, inexorable self-possession and desire
to be free. Laws deputized potential and present property owners to make and
keep property for the markets by stimulating their self-interest. With promises
to conﬁrm property claims, legislatures invested whites personally in the racial
hierarchy that guided property production. Courts then reinforced this work in
private disputes by privileging property rights above the dignity of human life
and the conditions necessary to sustain it. Racial violence thereby percolated into
the fabric of social relations, so that property interests also engaged nonwhites
in the defense of themselves, their communities, and their homelands.
The foregoing Parts together, therefore, show how profoundly property law
has shaped the social and economic world of America, in ways that present property-law casebooks and curricula fail to show. The homesteading principle enlisted families across the colonies and then the nation to carry out the violence of
conquest in the name of creating or raising the monetary value of property for
themselves and the collective in pursuit of the American Dream. The slave trade
that grew in tandem with the land market deeply entrenched racial violence as
both a market tool and a social norm, as the trade of these interdependent commodities reached unprecedented levels of speed and scale. The erasure of histories of racial violence from property law makes it difficult to appreciate the great
extent to which lingering practices and norms arose from conditions unique to
the context of this enterprise. For example, not only did colonists act under a
racial framework and use violence authorized by the discovery principle, but they
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also perceived the lands of others as inexhaustible raw material. The goal of their
settlement was proﬁt-making, rather than long-term social stability.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the material now omitted from property law
sheds light on the historical evolution of the land system that underpins the real
estate market and its structural reliance on racial violence to produce value.
These aspects of property law are likely the most intuitive points of entry to the
subject in a world of rapidly changing urban environments, rising rents, racial
segregation, and homelessness across the country. Moreover, the stakes are now
global, as the lucrative nature of the American property-law system has made it
a model for propagation around the world.358 As it continues to produce inequity
with wealth, this contest over history will determine whether we understand the
American system as a beacon or a challenge—whether we see the widespread and
deep hardship it imposes as aberrational or endemic to it, and whether or not we
are willing to grapple with its costs.
conclusion
This Article has probed the questions of what we believe we know about a
subject and why we think we know it. In the main, it has contended that the
centuries-long effort to produce, maintain, and develop new forms of property
in lands wrested from Native nations and enslaved people guided the development of American property law in ways that impact us to this day. These histories train us to look differently at the costs of property-law institutions and practices and teach us about the variety of ways in which racial logic works through
law. The history of law, like the history of knowledge production, has been characterized by much path dependence. Prevailing epistemic norms of erasure mean
that individuals and communities have accrued profound investments over time
in the narratives that explain their identity and the world they live in. However,
the histories of law and knowledge production are also full of instances in which
people made decisive choices, shifted norms, and countenanced great risk. The
instability and division that has grown out of these histories of racial violence is
rising yet again, and we must choose whether or not we will confront these histories head-on. The question is again on the table as to whether we will try, ﬁnally, to account for them and to address the consequences they have wrought.

358.
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appendix a
table 1 . casebooks examined
authors

casebook title

year
published

john chipman
gray
christopher
gustavus
tiedeman
elmer e. barrett
chicago college
of law
william a. finch

Select Cases and Other Authorities on the
Law of Property

1888

Selected Cases on Real Property. Selected
and Arranged for Use in Connection with
the Author’s Treatise on Real Property

1897

jasper c. gates
grant newell
william a. finch
john chipman
gray
william f. walsh
john r. rood
william a. finch
william l.
burdick
edward h.
warren
ralph william
aigler
henry a. bigelow
william a. finch
edward h.
warren
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Cases on the Law of Real Property

1898

Illustrative Cases on Real Property

1898

Selected Cases on the Law of Property in
Land
Cases on the Law of Real Property

1898

Elements of the Law of Real Property, with
Leading and Illustrative Cases
Selected Cases on the Law of Property in
Land
Select Cases and Other Authorities on the
Law of Property

1902

Select Cases on the Law of Real Property

1906

Decisions, Statutes &c. Concerning the
Law of Estates in Land [Rood Real Property Cases]
Selected Cases on the Law of Property in
Land
Illustrative Cases on the Law of Real Property

1909

Select Cases and Other Authorities on the
Law of Property

1915

Titles to Real Property, Acquired Originally and by Transfer Inter Vivos

1916

Introduction to the Law of Real Property;
Rights in Land
Selected Cases on the Law of Property in
Land
Select Cases and Other Authorities on the
Law of Property

1919

1898

1904
1906

1912
1914

1919
1919
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homer bliss
dibell
joseph daniel
sullivan
william f. walsh
joseph warren
john howard
easterday
christopher
gustavus
tiedeman and guy
mervin wood
john philip
maloney
victor henry kulp
basil h. pollitt
john a. blake
american school
harry a. bigelow
and francis w.
jacob
john h. easterday
james j. o’leary
william f. walsh
ralph william
aigler
byron robert
bentley
marion rice
kirkwood
everett fraser

Cases on Real Property

1920

Selected Cases on Real Property

1921

Select Cases on the Law of Property Real
and Personal
Select Cases and Other Authorities on the
Law of Conveyances and Related Subjects
Cases on the Law of Real Property

1922

Cases on Real Property. Selected and Arranged for Use in Connection with the Author’s Treatise on Real Property

1925

Selected Cases on the Law of Real Property

1927

Cases on Titles to Real Property: As Effected by Acknowledgments, Recording,
Curative Acts, Possession, and Lis Pendens
Cases on Problems in the Law of Real
Property
Cases on the Law of Real Property

1928

Real Property, Titles to Estates: Introductory Lecture, Illustrative Cases, Court Decisions, Glossary, and Review Questions
Cases on the Law of Personal Property

1931

Cases on the Law of Real Property IIhornbook
Real Property: Key Principles, Cases,
Questions Analyzed, Answered
Cases on the Law of Property

1931

Cases on the Law of Titles to Real Property, Acquired Originally and by Transfer
Inter Vivos
Cases in Real Estate and Property Law

1932

1932

Cases on the Law of Conveyances

1932

Cases and Readings on Property; Introduction to Real and Personal Property

1932

1922
1925

1928
1930

1931

1931
1931
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byron robert
bentley
richard roy
powell
harry a. bigelow
and joseph
warren madden
frank l. mechem
everett fraser
albert martin
kales and horace
e. whiteside
john philip
maloney
roy fielding
wrigley
edward h.
warren
harry a. bigelow
and others
arthur t. martin
max rheinstein
william f. walsh
john a. blake
harry a. bigelow
and sheldon
tefft
byron r. bentley
ray andrews
brown

marion rice
kirkwood
oliver s. rundell
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Business Law of Real Property

1933

Cases and Materials on the Law of Possessory Estates

1933

Introduction to the Law of Real Property:
Rights in Land

1934

Supplementary Cases for Real Property

1935

Cases and Readings on Property; Introduction to Real and Personal Property
Cases on the Law of Property, Future Interests and Illegal Conditions and Restraints

1936

Selected Cases on the Law of Real Property

1936

Cases and Materials on the Law of Property

1937

Cases on Property

1938

Cases and Other Materials on the Law of
Property

1938

Cases and Other Materials on the Law of
Conveyances
Cases and Other Materials on the Law of
Property
Cases on the Law of Property (and Niles?)

1939

Cases on the Law of Realty Titles

1940

Cases and Other Materials on the Law of
Property

1940

Real Estate Law with Case Texts and
Forms
Cases and Materials on the Law of Real
Property: A First Course on the Law of
Real Property, Consisting of the Law of
Estates in Land and an Historical Introduction
Cases and Materials on the Law of Conveyances

1940

Cases and Materials on Rights in Land

1941

1936

1939
1939

1941

1941
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william f. walsh
and russell d.
niles
everett fraser
ralph william
aigler
victor henry kulp
harry a. bigelow
and willard
leland eckhardt
william edward
burby
arthur theodore
martin
richard roy
belden powell
harry a. bigelow
harry augustus
bigelow and
sheldon tefft
victor henry kulp
john a. blake
myres mcdougal
john a. blake
a. james casner
ralph william
aigler, harry a.
bigelow, richard
roy belden
powell, allan f.
smith, and
sheldon tefft

Cases on the Law of Property

1941

Cases and Readings on Property: Introduction to Real and Personal Property
Cases and Materials on the Law of Titles to
Real Property, Acquired Originally and by
Transfer Inter Vivos
Cases on Titles to Real Property: As Effected by Acknowledgments, Recording,
Curative Acts, Possession, and Lis Pendens
Cases and Other Materials on the Law of
Personal Property

1941

Illustrative Cases on the Law of Real Property

1943

Cases and Other Materials on the Law of
Real Property

1943

Cases and Materials on the Law of Possessory Estates

1943

Cases and Materials on Rights in Land:
With an Introduction to the Law of Real
Property
Cases and Other Materials on the Law of
Property

1945

Cases on Titles to Real Property: As Effected by Acknowledgments, Recording,
Curative Acts, Possession, and Lis Pendens
Cases on the Law of Real Property

1947

Property, Wealth, Land: Allocation, Planning and Development
Cases on the Law of Realty Titles

1948
1948

Cases and text on property

1949

Introduction to the law of real property:
Rights in land/Cases and materials on the
law of property

1950

1942

1942

1942

1946

1948
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ralph william
aigler, harry a.
bigelow, richard
roy belden
powell, allan f.
smith, and
sheldon tefft
william f. walsh
and russell
denison niles
kenneth s.
skolfield
edward s. bade
howard r.
williams
everett fraser
edward s. bade
howard r.
williams
byron robert
bentley
joseph dainow
william f. walsh,
russel d. niles,
and elmer m.
million
james j. hayden
a. james casner
james j. hayden
ralph w. aigler,
allan f. smith,
and sheldon
tefft
john e. cribbet
william h.
farnham
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Cases and Materials on the Law of Property

1951

Cases on the law of property

1951

Cases and Materials on the Law of Real
Property: A First Course in the Law of
Real Property
Cases and materials on real property and
conveyancing
Cases and Materials on the Law of Property

1952

Cases and Readings on Personal Property:
Introduction
Cases and Materials on Real Property and
Conveyancing
Cases and Materials on the Law of Property

1954

Real Estate Law, with Cases, Text, and
Forms

1954

Civil Law Property: Cases and Materials

1955

Cases on the Law of Property

1955

Elements of Real Property Law: Cases and
Text
Cases and text on property

1957
1958

Elements of Property Law: Cases and Text

1959

Cases on Property

1959

Cases and materials on property

1960

Cases and Notes on Property in Land and
Chattels

1960

1953
1954

1954
1954
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john a. blake
richard l. braun
a. james casner
jan z.
krasnowiecki
james b.
macdonald,
walter raushenbush, and james
beuscher
curtis j. berger
olin l. browder,
jr.
john e. cribbet
edna l. hebard
and gerald s.
meisel
curtis j. berger
a. james casner
curtis j. berger,
allan axelrod,
and quintin
johnstone
john e. cribbet
olin l. browder,
jr.
edward h. rabin
george lefcoe
charles donahue,
jr.
charles haar
neil k. komesar
edward cohen
richard h. chused
john e. cribbet

Cases on the Law of Realty Titles

1962

Cases and Materials on Real Property
(manuscript?)
Cases and text on property

1963
1963

Cases and Materials on Ownership and
Development of Land

1964

Sales of Land: Cases and Materials

1965

Cases and Materials on Property I: Land
Ownership and Use
Basic property law

1965

Cases and materials on property

1966

Cases and Problem Analysis in Real Estate
Law

1966

Land Ownership and Use: Cases, Statutes,
and Other Materials
Cases and Text on Property

1967

Land Transfer and Finance: Cases and Materials

1969

Cases and Materials on Property I: Land
Ownership and Use
Basic property law

1971

Fundamentals of modern real property law

1973

American Land Law: Cases and Materials

1974

Cases and materials on property: an introduction to the concept and the institution

1974

Property and law

1974

Analytical materials for the study of real
property
Materials for a Basic Course in Property

1977

A modern approach to property: cases,
notes, and materials
Cases and materials on property

1966

1968

1972

1977
1978
1978
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olin l. browder,
jr.
jesse dukeminier
and james krier
myres smith
mcdougal and
luther l.
mcdougal
edward h. rabin
charles donahue,
jr.
john e. cribbet
olin l. browder,
jr.
paul goldstein
a. james casner
jon w. bruce,
james w. ely, jr.,
and c. dent
bostick
charles haar
sheldon f. kurtz
and herbert
hovenkamp
richard h. chused
jesse dukeminier
and james krier
olin l. browder,
jr.
jon w. bruce,
james w. ely, jr.,
and c. dent
bostick
john e. cribbet
lawrence w.
waggoner,
richard v.
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Basic property law

1978

Property and law

1979

Property, wealth, land: allocation, planning, and development

1981

Fundamentals of modern real property law

1981

Cases and materials on property: an introduction to the concept and the institution

1982

Cases and materials on property

1983

Basic property law

1984

Real property

1984

Cases and text on property

1984

Cases and Materials on Modern Property
Law

1984

Property and law

1984

Cases and materials on American property
law

1985

A modern approach to property: cases,
notes, and materials
Property

1987

Basic property law

1988

Cases and Materials on Modern Property
Law

1989

Cases and materials on property

1989

Family Property Law: Cases and Materials
on Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests

1990

1988
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wellman, gregory s. alexander,
and mary louise
fellows
sandra h.
johnson, timothy
s. jost, peter w.
salsich, jr., and
thomas l. shaffer
edward h. rabin
joseph william
singer
charles donahue,
jr.
jesse dukeminier
and james krier
sheldon f. kurtz
and herbert
hovenkamp
jon w. bruce and
james w. ely, jr.
john e. cribbet
curtis berger
joseph william
singer
jesse dukeminier
and james krier
j. gordon hylton
richard h. chused
a. james casner
edward h. rabin
joseph william
singer
james l. winokur,
r. wilson
freyermuth, and
jerome m. organ

Property Law: Cases, Materials and Problems

1991

Fundamentals of modern real property law

1992

Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices

1992

Cases and materials on property: an introduction to the concept and the institution

1993

Property

1993

Cases and materials on American property
law

1993

Cases and Materials on Modern Property
Law

1993

Cases and materials on property

1994

Property Land Ownership and Use

1996

Property Law Rules, Policies, and Practices

1997

Property

1997

Property law and the public interest: cases
and materials
A modern approach to property: cases,
notes, and materials
Cases and text on property

1998

1999

Fundamentals of modern real property law

2000

Introduction to Property

2000

Property and Lawyering

2001

1998
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jesse dukeminier
and james krier
john e. cribbet
sheldon f. kurtz
and herbert
hovenkamp
j. gordon hylton
a. james casner
edward h. rabin
joseph william
singer
james l. winokur,
r. wilson
freyermuth, and
jerome m. organ
john g. sprankling and
raymond r. coletta
roger bernhardt,
joyce palomar,
and patrick
randolph jr.
jesse dukeminier,
james krier,
gregory
alexander, and
michael schill
joseph william
singer
d. barlow burke,
ann m. burkhart,
and r.h.
helmholz
richard h. chused
edward e. chase
and julia p.
forrester
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Property and law

2002

Cases and materials on property

2002

Cases and materials on American property
law

2002

Property law and the public interest: cases
and materials
Cases and text on property

2003
2003

Fundamentals of modern real property law

2004

Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices

2006

Property and lawyering

2006

Property: A Contemporary Approach

2009

Property: Statutes and Cases

2009

Property

2010

Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices

2010

Fundamentals of Property Law

2010

Cases, Materials, and Problems in Property

2010

Property Law: Cases, Materials, and Questions

2010
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alfred l. brophy,
alberto lopez,
and kali murray
edward h. rabin
james l. winokur,
r. wilson
freyermuth, and
jerome m. organ
david l. callies
r. wilson
freyermuth and
jerome m. organ
john g.
sprankling and
raymond r.
coletta
thomas w.
merrill and
henry e. smith
sheldon f. kurtz,
carol necole
brown, and
herbert
hovenkamp
calvin r. massey
eric t. freyfogle
and bradley
karkkainen
grant s. nelson,
dale a. whitman,
colleen e. mcdill,
and shelley ross
saxer
jesse dukeminier,
james a. krier,
gregory s.
alexander, lior
strahilevitz, and
michael schill

Integrating spaces: property law and race

2010

Fundamentals of modern real property law

2011

Property and lawyering

2011

Concise Introduction to Property Law

2011

Property and Lawyering

2011

Property: A Contemporary Approach

2011

Property: Principles and Policies

2012

Cases and Materials on American Property
Law

2012

Property Law: Principles, Problems, and
Cases
Property Law: Power, Governance, and the
Common Good

2012

Contemporary Property

2012

Property

2013

2012
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table 2 . volumes examined but excluded from analysis
authors

casebook title

year
published

sayre macneil,
james angell
mclaughlin, and
edward warren
sayre macneil,
james angell
mclaughlin, and
sidney post
simpson
allison dunham

Cases and Notes Supplementary to Warren’s Cases on the Law of Property

1931

Cases and Notes Supplementary to Warren’s Cases on the Law of Property

1933

Modern Real Estate Transactions: Cases
and Materials
Modern Real Estate Transactions Cases
and Materials

1951

allison dunham

1958

table 3 . casebooks identified but not obtained for
analysis
authors

casebook title

year
published

william sullivan
pattee
john chipman
gray
paul goldstein
susan f. french
and gerald
korngold

Illustrative Cases in Realty

1894

Select Cases and Other Authorities on the
Law of Property

1904

Real property

1984

Cases and Text on Property

2018
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appendix b
Topics
conquest

slavery

cases

search terms

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543,
590 (1823)

“Discovery”

The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (1825)
Com. v. Aves, 35 Mass. 193 (1836)
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857)

racially
restrictive
covenants

Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323
(1926)
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)

racial zoning

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917)

“Conquest”
“Colon[y/ies]”
“Indian”
“Native”
“Tribe”
“Slave[s]”/”slavery”
“Negro[es]”
“Black”
“Mulatto”
“Colored”
“Negro[es]”
“Black”
“Colored”
“Race”/“racial”/
“restrictive” +
“covenant”
“Negro[es]”
“Black”
“Colored”
“African American”
“Race”/“racial” +
“zoning”
“Land use”
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